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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Thailand is one of five U.S. treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the only U.S. 
treaty ally in continental Southeast Asia, and is a major non-NATO ally.  Therefore, it 
should be understood that maintaining a close relationship with the Kingdom of Thailand 
is critical to U.S. policy throughout the region.    
U.S.-Thai relations boast a long history.  The first diplomatic ties were established 
through the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833 and during the reign of King 
Mongkut, he offered President Abraham Lincoln elephants to use in battle during the 
U.S. Civil War.1  Thai troops fought alongside American soldiers in World War I, Korea, 
and Vietnam.  
Throughout the Cold War, Thailand enjoyed a uniquely positive relationship with 
the United States because it was viewed as a front-line state in the war against 
communism.2  During the Vietnam War, basing rights in Thailand at locations such as 
Korat Air Base (AB), Utapao AB, and Nakorn Phanom AB, were critical to U.S. mission 
accomplishment during the war.  As a result of their role, Thailand was given substantial 
military and development assistance, in the form of grant aid for training3 and the 
building of infrastructure and roads throughout the country. 
                                                 
1 Asia Foundation, “Bilateral Conference on United States-Thailand Relations in the 21st Century,” 
(Washington DC, 11-13 March 2002), 1.   
2 Ibid.  
3 Until today, Thailand is still one of the leading recipients of grant aid funding for training under the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), formerly known as the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP); Thailand has trained close to 25,000 military personnel in the U.S. under these program; 
Thailand’s IMET program has consistently been ranked in the top five, largest programs in the world; in 
2000 & 2001, Thailand’s IMET program was the largest in the world, receiving $1.730M USD and 
$1.852M USD respectively; the author was the U.S.’ training manager to Thailand from 1999-2004, where 
he managed Thailand’s IMET, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and other training programs, such as 
Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism and Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).   
 2
After Vietnam, U.S.-Thai relations weakened.4  In the period of 1975 to 1976, 
Thai bureaucrats advanced a policy of “equidistance” and during the 1980s Thailand 
commenced with an “omnidirectionality” policy, where Thailand not only recognized the 
U.S., but also recognized the importance of ASEAN, China, Vietnam, and the Soviet 
Union.5  More issues would cause U.S.-Thai relations to oscillate during the last decade 
of the century, Persian Gulf War, 1992 Black May massacre, China’s military aid to 
Thailand, and the 1997 economic crisis.6  However, despite what may have occurred in 
the political sphere, U.S.-Thai military relations have always been close.     
In recent years, upon the request from the U.S., Thailand has participated in 
several missions, proving the closeness of U.S.-Thai military relations: East Timor, 
Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  After East Timor 
announced their intentions to secede from Indonesia and form an independent nation in 
1999, Thailand, while still recovering from the Asian economic crisis,7 sent peacekeepers 
to East Timor under the United Nations operation International Force in East Timor 
(InterFET) and more troops during UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET).8   
Immediately after the events of September 11th, Thailand’s cooperation was key 
during OEF when the Royal Thai Government (RTG) allowed the U.S. to preposition 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) KC-135 tankers at Utapao AB, a Royal Thai Navy aerial port, in 
Chonburi province.  The mission of the tankers was to support the “air bridge” during the 
                                                 
4 After the USS Mayaguez incident, 12 May 1975, Thailand officially protested the act of the U.S. 
using Thailand’s sovereign territory to launch attacks on the Khmer forces who seized the USS Mayaguez; 
in Bangkok rioting occurred outside the U.S. Embassy, America flags were burned, and the Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) ordered the cessation of the use of its bases by the U.S.; op cit, Ralph Wetterhahn, The 
Last Battle, (NY: Penguin, 2001), 256. 
5 Paul Chambers, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, (December 2004), 461.  
6 Ibid., 461-463.   
7 During the crisis, Thailand’s currency, the Baht, was devalued by over 50 percent, fifty-eight 
financial firms were closed in one day, and the RTG received $17.2B USD in loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to bolster their currency reserves, op cit, Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, 
Thailand’s Boom and Bust, (Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1998), 124.  
8 During the InterFET phase, Thailand provided a battalion-sized task force, RTA MG Songkitti 
Jaggabatra was named deputy commander of the InterFET mission; in 2000, Thailand was selected to lead 
the UNTAET mission and sent another battalion-sized element; commanding general was LGEN Boonsang 
Niampradit.   
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USAF’s B-2 bombing campaign of Afghanistan.  On 14 December 2001, while meeting 
with President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, Thailand's Prime Minister (PM) 
Thaksin Shinawatra, expressed the Kingdom of Thailand's willingness to provide troops 
and equipment in support of OEF.  The result was the deployment of a 130-man Royal 
Thai Army construction engineer company in 2003, the first non-NATO, out-of-region 
country to provide forces to the global war on terrorism (WoT).9  On 30 September 2003, 
Thailand sent another signal to the U.S. and the world that they were committed to the 
U.S.’ efforts to combat world terrorism by sending the first Thai troops to Iraq.  The RTG 
sent a battalion-sized task force, composed primarily of construction engineers and 
medical teams to Karbala Iraq.10 
Following the attacks in the U.S., the world witnessed a significant rise in militant 
Muslim insurgency around the world, to include a rise in militant Islamic radicalism in 
southern Thailand.  The Royal Thai Government (RTG) once again found itself 
embroiled in counter-insurgency operations with Malay-Muslim separatists at their 
southern border.  This rejuvenated insurgency is once again threatening stability 
throughout the country and the region.   
Over the past 30 years, approximately 800 people have been victimized by 
criminal acts associated to separatist operations in southern Thailand-mostly in the 
provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Naratiwat.  The inhabitants of this region, the Malay-
Muslims, are ethnically and religiously closer to Malays than Thais.  The Malay-Muslim 
population in Thailand’s deep-south has historically been deprived and neglected and the 
area is grossly underdeveloped.  Poverty, drug addiction, and violence are rampant.  The 
result to this depressed region, in concert with the new global emergence of Islamic 
                                                 
9 Their primary mission was to repair Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan; secondary missions included, but 
were are not limited to, providing general horizontal and vertical construction capabilities with organic 
personnel and equipment.  Unit members were handpicked and training was robust.  Reports after their 
return were very favorable, stating that the Thai’s commitment there greatly improved the operational 
capability and quality of life for over 30 coalition countries in the area. 
10  Mission while in Karbala was to build and repair new and existing infrastructure; additionally, the 
RTG sent six, level-one medical teams who worked to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people 
through coalition civil affairs engagement and provided cross-training to third country national medical 
units.   
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militancy has witnessed a renewed intensity to an insurgency problem believed to have 
been eliminated more than a decade ago.    
B. PURPOSE 
This research focuses on historical, strategic, and geopolitical issues facing the 
U.S. and Royal Thai governments in combating southern Thai separatism and how 
leveraging emerging technologies – such as an NPS field experimentation program 
entitled the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) - 
can assist with counter-insurgency operations in southern Thailand.  This thesis analyzes 
how employing technologies such as those used by the COASTS program, i.e. unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and lighter-than-air vehicles (LTA), unattended air and ground 
sensors, and wireless network technology, can assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
in tracking suspected separatists and possibly international terrorists in the southern Thai 
provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Naratiwat. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
In essence, Thailand’s southern separatist problem has resurfaced after a two 
decade hiatus.  For several decades, from Cold War insurgency operations through their 
recent struggles with drug and human trafficking, sealing Thailand’s porous border has 
been one of the Royal Thai Government’s top national security objectives.  
Understanding the “openness” of their borders, the RTG has asked NPS to assist them in 
designing a border defense system that incorporates the use of UAVs and meshed 
networks.   
Therefore, as one of Thailand’s staunchest allies in Southeast Asia, it is 
imperative that the U.S. government (USG) assist the Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
with their request.  In fact, assisting the RTG in securing Thai borders directly supports 
one of the USG’s primary national security objectives, mainly the War on Terror (WoT).  
It also advances U.S. national security interests by promoting stability in the region and a 
close relationship with the RTG provides present and future access to Thai airfields and 
ports for our forces to conduct contingency missions as required.  Thailand’s cooperation 
in allowing the U.S. to use their airfields and ports is not only essential to support WoT, 
but counter-drug, anti-piracy operations, activities of the Joint Task Force Full 
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Accounting and POW/MIA missions, and they provide the location for the annual Cobra 
Gold exercise, the largest overseas joint/combined training opportunity for U.S. forces in 
the Pacific area of operations (AOR).   
D. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT  
Thailand shares a porous 4,800 kilometer border with Burma, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Malaysia.  Will leveraging emerging technologies assist in securing Thailand’s 
historically porous borders, specifically, their southern border with Malaysia, and assist 
the RTG in tracking suspected separatists (and possible international terrorists) in the 
southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat?   
For decades, from communist insurgency operations during the Cold War period 
through their on-going drug war, Thailand’s “open borders” have been a direct threat to 
their internal security and an indirect threat to U.S. security interests.  With the recent 
increase in southern unrest and the capture of Riduan Ismuddin, a.k.a. Hambali, 
suspected leader of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), al-Qaeda’s branch in Southeast Asia, these 
events have reemphasized the importance of developing a system to assist in securing 
Thailand’s borders.   
Realizing the U.S. military has the resources and technical ability to devise a 
border defense system, various U.S. coalition partners (to include Thailand) have 
approached NPS regarding such a capability.  One potential answer was the development 
of the NPS COASTS program, which incorporates commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
technologies that strive to address DOD and coalition partner requirements associated 
with the WoT and other security missions.  COASTS aims to provide a capacity to assist 
the RTG with securing their borders, specifically in areas that are designated national 
priority by the RTG.   
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Using a combination of primary and secondary sources this thesis analyzes the 
southern separatist problem facing the RTG once again.  Additionally, first-hand 
knowledge of emerging and COTS technologies and their capabilities was established 
during two COASTS field experiments in Thailand during the past twelve months.   
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While in Thailand for the two COASTS experiments, several interviews were 
conducted as well, adding insight to the issues facing the RTG.  Dr. Suchart Bamrungsuk, 
RTG National Security Council (NSC) member and national security expert, 
Chulalongkorn University, was interviewed in March 2005.  As a member of the RTG’s 
NSC and with his background in academia, Dr. Suchart’s insight into the history of 
southern Thailand and his recommendations for resolving the issues in the south were 
invaluable.  Additionally, the author visited the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ (RTARF) 
Directorate of Research and Development (DRDO) again to discuss the nature of the 
problem in the south and to learn about their plans for trying to reduce the tensions in the 
south.      
F. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER REVIEW 
Chapter II, “The Current Security Situation in Southern Thailand,” analyzes the 
security concerns facing the RTG.  It gives a detailed history of southern Thailand, 
focusing on four elements: the resurgence of Patani Raya or the Greater Patani State, 
Patani’s conversion to Islam, the role Patani played in ancient times, and the claims to 
southern Thai separatism by the Malay-Muslims.  Lastly, this chapter analyzes the 
resurgence of recent southern Thai violence and the possible associated actors.     
Chapter III, “Thailand’s Border Security Challenge and the Malaysia 
Connection,” focuses on the physical and political relationship between Thailand and 
Malaysia, analyzing the border region between the two nations, particularly the porous 
nature of the Thai-Malay border.  It then examines how dual citizenship aggravates the 
situation in southern Thailand.  Lastly, Chapter III discusses the “Malaysian Connection,” 
and the role of external players, in particular the Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) in the 
southern Thailand problem.   
Chapter IV, “Emerging Technologies,” provides a detailed explanation of 
emerging technologies will be presented.  This chapter will introduce the various 
technologies at the disposal of the RTG, demonstrating how commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) technologies can be integrated to fuse and display information into a real-time, 
tactical, coalition enabled command and control (C2) center; all of which can be done at 
relatively low-cost and with very little burden placed on the logistics system.   
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An introduction of COASTS and each of the major elements of COASTS will be 
discussed, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), lighter-than-air (LTA) platforms, 
various sensing elements, the wireless meshed networks (802.11b and 802.16 systems), 
and some of the tactical devices such as tacticomps and language translation devices to 
name a few.   
Chapter V, “Conclusion,” summarizes the research, highlighting why COASTS 
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II. SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
Thailand’s southern region has once again erupted in violence after two decades 
of relative tranquility.  Not since the late 1970s has the Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
had to contend with the issue of separatism as currently being experienced.  The 
complexion of the attacks, the tactics, and the manner in which the operations have been 
conducted are significantly different than previously witnessed.11  In one year, from 
January through December 2004, more than 600 Thais were victimized by acts of 
violence and terror in southern Thailand, all occurring in the three southernmost 
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat.12      
This chapter analyzes the current security situation in southern Thailand.  Doing 
so, it is prudent to examine how Islam overcame the Hindu-Buddhist region of insular 
Southeast Asia, and parts of continental Southeast Asia, specifically the Malay Peninsula.  
The following sections describe the history of southern Thailand, focusing on four 
elements: the resurgence of Patani Raya or the Greater Patani State,13 Patani’s conversion 
to Islam, the role Patani played in ancient times, and the claims to southern Thai 
separatism by the Malay-Muslims.  Lastly, this thesis analyzes the resurgence of recent 
southern Thai violence, and the possible associated actors.   
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTHERN 
THAILAND 
The region of Southeast Asia is at the crossroads for culture and religion within 
the core.  Every major religion is represented in Southeast Asia, from Roman 
Catholicism, which is the predominant religion in the Philippines, to Theravada 
Buddhism in continental Southeast Asia, to Hinduism on Java.  However, Islam is the 
major religion in insular Southeast Asia, with small Muslim minority groups located in 
                                                 
11 Anthony Davis, “Thai Militants Adopt New Bombing Tactics,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 
http://www4.janes.com/ (accessed on 4 Feb 2005), 1.   
12 Anthony Davis, “No End in Sight for Southern Thailand’s Escalading Insurgency,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, http://www4janes.com (accessed 29 Mar 2005), 2.   
13 The English rendering of the name “Patani” is based on Malay spelling, while the Thai government 
usage of “Pattani” is based on Thai spelling, Op. Cit., Thanet Aphornsuvan, “Origins of Malay Muslim 
“Separatism” in Southern Thailand,” Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 32 (October 2004), 
1.   
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continental Southeast Asia.  Insular Southeast Asia is home to the world’s largest Muslim 
country, Indonesia, where approximately 200 million Muslims reside.  In fact, of the 
approximate 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, nearly 20% reside in Southeast Asia.14  
Table 1. Muslim Population Numbers in Southeast Asia15 
 
Islam was brought to the region by Arab merchants traveling to and from China, 
as far back as the seventh century.  As the Indians did before them, Arab merchants used 
the ports of Malaya (Malacca) and Northern Sumatra (Aceh) as ports-of-call or stopping 
points along their journeys to China, Canton to be specific.  One of the earliest Islamic 
relics in insular Southeast Asia is the headstone of a Javanese woman dated 1082 AD.16  
However, some experts dispute this reference.  What is not disputed is the spread of the 
religion from about the end of the thirteenth century to about the seventeenth century.  
Islam was introduced to the region only after it had taken hold in India around the late 
1200s.17  
The conquest of Malacca (and Java to some degree) was one impetus for religious 
change in Southeast Asia from their animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions to Islam that 
spurred the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.  From ancient times until today, the 
straight of Malacca has been a strategic location and prime real estate for any merchant 
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15 Ibid.   
16 Barbara Watson Andaya, Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press 1999), Volume 2, Chapter 4, 169.  
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ship passing into or out of East Asia.  Malacca’s straight is narrow and provides 
protection and shelter during the annual monsoons.  Therefore Malacca’s conversion to 
Islam made trade among the merchants of the time much easier.  Once Malacca 
converted and their relationship with neighboring Sumatra improved, the flood gate 
opened for Islamic conversion throughout the archipelago.18   
The other impetus for change came with the conversion of the ruling elites within 
the region.  Robert Hefner states, “conversion was not conquest or religious warfare, but 
trade and interethnic intercourse.”19  Therefore, the conversion to Islam was not forced 
upon the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia, but was made through conscious choice 
mainly for survival and to facilitate trade.   
  
Figure 1. The Spread of Islam in SEA from the 13th to 18th Centuries20 
 
B. HISTORY OF SOUTHERN THAILAND 
1. The Emergence of Patani Raya 
The conversion of Patani to Islam began in Aceh.  Due to its location, on the 
northwest corner of the island of Sumatra, Aceh was the first to come in contact with the 
west.  It developed into the region’s center for culture and religion.  In terms of religion, 
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20 University of Calgary, http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/imageislam/Seasia.gif 
(accessed 4 August 2005).   
 12
as with most areas in the archipelago, prior to Islam arriving, the religion was a mixture 
of animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.21   
Prior to the land that was once known as Patani Raya, or Pattani today, there was 
an ancient kingdom called Langkasuka.22  From about the eight century AD, the coastal 
areas of Langkasuka became very important commercial ports.  Because of Langasuka’s 
location, situated at the isthmus, with access to two coasts, it was suitable for ships to 
dock on its eastern shores, along the Gulf of Thailand, unload goods, and transport these 
goods overland to the western coast, where other merchant ships would be waiting for the 
cargo.  The cargo could then be safely taken to ports in India and the Middle East.  Thus, 
merchants could save time and money and could avoid the risk of losing cargo to raiders 
when passing around the Malay Peninsula.  
The dissolution of the Majapahit kingdom around the late 1400s allowed religious 
prostilization to occur, especially from neighboring Pasai Sumatra.  Therefore, Patani 
Raya emerged around this time.  The exact date of when Patani Raya was formed is still 
debated.  However, some Thai scholars believe the Greater Patani Region was formed 15 
June 1457, when Langkasuka, under the leadership of Tu Antara, officially announced its 
conversion to Islam.23  Upon converting to Islam, Tu Antara assumed a Malay name, 
Sultan Ismail Shah, to show his conviction to Islam.24  This conversion to Islam, granted 
Patani certain trading rights with Muslim merchants who controlled the western trade at 
the time.   
The Greater Patani State was one of the first Malay states to convert to Islam, 
certainly well before Malacca.  Patani was known as the center for culture and religion in 
                                                 
21 Anthony Shih, “The Roots and Societal Impact of Islam in Southeast Asia,” Stanford Journal of 
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Syukri, History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani, trans. Conner Baily and John N. Miksic (Ohio University 
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the region.  Some Thai scholars, such as W.K. Che Man, have stated, “Patani has been 
held to be one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia.”25  Patani Raya has even been 
called the Veranda or Window to Mecca.   
Patani’s history can be divided into several periods or eras: 
1. The Golden Era (1457-1776)  
2. The Era of Change (1776-1816) 
3. The Era of Ruin (1816-1901) 
4. The Era of Dissolution (1901-1991)26  
No one can dispute what Patani grew to be in terms of development.  During the 
Golden Era period, there were 16 sultans and governors and 17 other rulers or lords.27  
Patani led the region in various ways, becoming the center or institute for Islamic studies.  
Patani was also known for its mosques, madari (pondoks or Islamic schools), and the 
Islamic court.  Patani was a center for Arabic studies as well.  Additionally, Patani was 
known for its crafting of military weapons, such as swords, bows and arrows, the Kris 
(the Malay dagger) and the production of artillery (cannons).   
Unfortunately, the end of the Golden Era came in 1776 when Sultan Muhammad 
united the “nation” after a 47 year civil war.28  In 1786, Patani fell to Siamese rule, 
fought for its freedom from Siamese rule several times after this, in 1789 and again in 
1791, with little success.   
In 1816, under Rama II, Patani entered into the Era of Ruin or what some call the 
period of the “Seven Districts.”  Siam adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy to control 
Patani more effectively.  The Patani Kingdom was divided into seven areas or provinces: 
Patani, Nongjik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring.29  Siam controlled the 
                                                 
25 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 32.   
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27 Ibid. 
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region by sending central government officials, who were Buddhist, to administer the 
southern Muslim-Malay areas.  Additionally, there was a campaign to relocate Buddhists 
to the area to balance the population, therefore counterpoising the power.30  From 1831 to 
1832, the south erupted in war; the central government deployed some 300,000 Siamese 
troops to the region and defeated the Malay-Muslims.31  In 1839, another revolt ensued 
and the result was the same, the Malay-Muslims were defeated.   
Externally, from about 1816 to the end of the century, vast changes occurred in 
Southeast Asia.  Battles between two of the world’s most dominant imperialists (England 
and France) took place.  England had control over most lands from India to Burma, 
including the Malay Peninsula.  France had Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia).  This 
left Siam as a buffer state sandwiched between two hegemonic powers. This was a 
crucial development that contributed to the demise of the Patani Kingdom.  The turn of 
the century was a watershed time for the region.  By 1909, the Patani Kingdom would be 
dissolved forever.   
In 1901, the region’s administration was renamed once again by Rama V, from 
the “Seven Districts” to the “Area of the Seven Provinces.”32  Patani’s old system of 
allowing the local governors certain freedoms was dashed.  Malay-Muslims had to 
recognize the Siamese king as the leader of the area, and they had to obey the laws 
established by the central government.  This lead to the permanent dissolution of self-
governance in the south.      
Even more changes in the administration of the area occurred in 1906.  The area 
was now called “Metropolitan Patani” (Monthon in Thai) after Rama VI’s redesignation.  
This change saw the seven areas meld into four: Patani, Yala, Saiburi, and Satun.   
By 1909, the entire southern region would eventually fall under total control of 
the central Siamese kingdom.  In March 1909, Siam and England signed the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty, which in effect legitimized Siamese control over the once great 
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Kingdom of Patani.33  After pleading with British administrators to allow their lands to 
fall under British rule, local leaders regrettably recognized Siamese sovereignty over the 
area.  Therefore, Siamese rule over what was once the Greater Patani Kingdom or Patani 
Raya, had officially begun.   
The 1800s, through the turn of the century, was a turbulent time for the Malay-
Muslims of southern Thailand.  It was also during this period their identity was formed.  
After a century of conflict, marginalization by the central government (the divide-and-
conquer strategy and using central Buddhist officials to administer the south), and by 
campaigns to balance the region, the Malay-Muslims’ identity was molded.  This identity 
is one of distrust and dislike for the central Buddhist government, an identity that lasts 
until today.  Additionally, an ethno-religious nexus34 between the Thais and the Malays 
formed due to their reluctance to assimilate into the central Siamese state.  This identity 
was shaped and manipulated by the Siamese further in subsequent years and is still a 
point of contention today.   
2. Claims to Muslim Separatism in the South 
The roots of southern separatism began during the various rebellions and 
uprisings after Patani fell to Siam in 1786.  Rebellions occurred in 1789, 1791, 1831 to 
1832, and again in 1839.  However, the formal succession of Patani into Siam in 1909 
began the “Siamization” of Patani, which would usher in modern day separatism in 
Thailand.   
During the turbulent times of 1901 to 1909, the Patani region saw its first serious 
separatist movement emerge.  Rajas Tengku Abdul Kadir Nilebai of Saiburi, Tuan 
Tengah Shamsuddin of Ra-ngae, and Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin of Patani were at 
the forefront of the resistance movements.  They protested against various administrative 
and governmental regulations and changes levied against Patani.  They refused to 
concede their power as governors or chaomuang and resented the fact that Muslims had 
to follow Buddhist centric Bangkok.  They also opposed changes to the Islamic courts.   
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The Siamese government, in order to squelch the rebellion from the various 
religious leaders and rajas, deposed and arrested several prominent southern leaders.  In 
1901, Tuan Tengah Shamsuddin of Ra-ngae was exiled to Songkla, only to be released 
after pledging to refrain from politics.35  In 1903, Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin of 
Patani was arrested and sent to Pitsanulok, where he spent 33 months in prison.36  Upon 
his release from prison, he pledged not to engage in resistance movements, but later 
reneged on his pledge.   
After 1901, during the “Siamization” of Patani, southern Thailand changed 
drastically, and threats against the south intensified.  The ever-increasing threat against 
the south by Bangkok was met just as equally by the inhabitants of southern Thailand.  
During this period, in Patani and southern Thailand the tradition of chaomuang or 
governors disappeared.  The raja also disappeared, along with the linage rights that 
accompanied the chaomuang and raja systems.  This period also ushered in the abolition 
of Islamic laws, along with the threat and abolition of Malay customs and traditions. 
a. Assimilation and the Various Policies 
Over time, Bangkok exerted more and more pressure, in the form of laws 
and policy, to gain a stronger grasp over the southern region.  Some examples of what the 
southern Malay-Muslims considered to be the first official attempts at forced assimilation 
came with the Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921 and in 1939 with the Thai 
Customs Decree. 
The passing of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) in 1910, and the coronation 
of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) in December 1911, Bangkok imposed more changes on 
the ever-changing Siam.37  Rama VI instituted educational reform under the 1921 
Compulsory Primary Education Act because of his scholastic abilities, his great love of 
education and literature, and the length of time he spent in England as a student.  This act 
introduced limited seven-year compulsory education in the country.38  Therefore, all 
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Malay-Muslim children were required to attend Thai primary schools.  From the central 
Thai government’s perspective, this was one way of introducing and promoting the Thai 
language throughout the country, to include the south.  This mandatory education was 
also another way of conducting nation building through a common language.  However, 
from the Malay-Muslim lens, the policy was just another way of eliminating the 
teachings of Islam. 
By this time, Siam had officially changed its name to Thailand (Land of 
the Free), under the leadership of the dictator and ultra-nationalist, Field Marshall Pibun 
Songkram.  The next major edict was the passage of the Thai Customs Decree in 1939.  
However, the south assumed Bangkok was only trying to control them.  The Thai 
Customs Decree was a policy that changed cultural practices and customs of various 
minority groups and reshaped the social habits of the entire population.39  Specifically 
the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand were now forbidden to dress in Malay fashion, 
use the Malay language, and follow various Islamic customs and traditions.  Additionally, 
some were even required, forced, to worship Buddhist images.40   
Outside of these two acts, there would be two other major attempts at 
controlling the south that would augment the distrust and intensify the fight for 
separation.  Both occurred in the 1960s under the leadership of the Thai Premiere, Field 
Marshall Sarit Tanarat.  In 1961, GEN Sarit reformed pondok schools and instituted a 
southern settlement project.   
Field Marshall Sarit along with other Thai bureaucrats thought Pondok 
schools were a hindrance to the central assimilation policy; therefore, reform had to take 
place.  Pondok schools teach in Malay and Arabic, and emphasize religious education, 
and have no system of assessment.  Hence these schools are not accredited by the 
government.41  Because the school’s curricula taught only Islamic subjects, which also 
perpetuated the Islamic and Malay customs, the schools were deemed a threat to the 
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central government and reform was necessary.  The Thai government forcibly changed 
pondok schools to match the instruction in Thai primary schools.  Prior to the reform in 
1961, there were 535 pondok schools in the region.  By 1991, after 30 years, only 189 
pondok schools remained.42 
Field Marshall Sarit also instituted his settlement project.  The program 
emphasized balancing the number of Thai-Buddhists against the number of Malay-
Muslims in the four southernmost provinces.  Thai-Buddhists from all over the kingdom 
were encouraged to move to the south into communes provided by the central 
government.  People who made the move were guaranteed seven to ten acres of land.43  
The project was successful in increasing the number of Thai-Buddhists, but it failed to 
balance the region. 
When Field Marshall Sarit died in 1963, he was succeeded by Field 
Marshall Thanom Kittikhachon.  During the rule of Prime Minister Thanom 
Kittikhachon, the aforementioned polices remained in use and no major changes 
transpired.  The Malay-Muslims were treated as second-class citizens; they were 
exploited, social ills and injustices were common; and more importantly, killings and 
punishment persisted without legal repercussions.44     
b. Emergence of Organized Groups  
Throughout the decades and the many generations since Thailand assumed 
control of the southern area from the Malay-Muslims, southern Thais have been 
“fighting” for their independence from Bangkok.  The roots of the modern southern Thai 
separatist movement date back to the reign of Field Marshall Pibun in the 1930’s.  Some 
reports state that by the 1960s, approximately 60 or so separatist groups existed, all 
dedicated to the Muslim-Malay movement.45 
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The first “organized” group dedicated to the southern situation was 
GAMPAR (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya or the League of Malays of Greater Patani).  
GAMPAR was an outgrowth of frustrated attempts by Patani nationalists in Kelantan to 
declare the independence of the state of Patani immediately after the Second World 
War.46  Established in 1947, GAMPAR’s objective was to found an autonomous Patani 
state.  The group’s leadership was dominated by religious leaders, and this was vastly 
different than prior resistance movements, which were spearheaded primarily by the 
southern aristocracy.  GAMPAR had a five point agenda:  
 
1. To bring together all Thai, Malay-Muslims for one cause;  
2. To build a relationship among Thai-Malays by which they could 
grow stronger and increase their living standards;  
3. To build a self-support network for their cause;  
4. To increase the living standards of the people who sought refuge in 
the deep-south; 
5. To develop Malay culture in the southern border provinces47    
 
If there was ever a time in modern Thai history when Patani could have 
escaped from the control of the central Thai government in Bangkok, it could have come 
during GAMPAR’s establishment in the late 1940s.  Along with the Patani People’s 
Movement, which also started in the late 1940s, the security situation in southern 
Thailand took a turn for the worst.  Violence between the southerners and the Thai police 
started to escalate.  In September of 1947, police units burned a village in Naratiwat, 
displacing 40 families.  Several prominent religious leaders were implicated by the 
police, were arrested, and charged with treason.  This outraged the population so much 
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that one month later, the southerners retaliated and violence ensued in the south resulting 
in eight Patani policemen being killed.48  
The situation in Patani and in other parts of the south continued to worsen.  
On 26 April 1948, villagers from Dusongyaw, Naratiwat, rose up against the perceived 
persecution of Muslims by government officials. The protests became violent and a 36-
hour clash ensued between armed villagers and security forces.  Reports of bomber 
aircraft and warships being sent to the region by the central Thai government started to 
circulate.49  The rebellion was crushed on 28 April 1948 (an important date that haunts 
the Thai government, and one that is discussed later in this thesis).  The government of 
Field Marshal Pibun claimed that between 30 and 100 Muslim villagers were killed on 
that day. However, other sources state that somewhere between 400 to 600 villagers were 
killed in the crackdown.50 
Understanding their plight would not garner the attention it needed in 
Bangkok, the Malay-Muslims sought help from the international community.  Close to 
250,000 Patani Muslims petitioned the United Nations to allow Patani and the other 
Malay-Muslim areas to secede from Thai control and to fall under the newly formed 
nation of Malaya.  Their pleas were not met favorably.  In January 1949, a treaty was 
signed between Thailand and England (Anglo-Thai Agreement) for joint control of the 
Thai-Malay border region.  With this treaty and the condemnation of GAMPAR by the 
British, the time for Patani to secede had passed.  
Communist Insurgency 
Following World War II and the Korean War, came the emergence of the 
Cold War and the threat of communism.  It was the policy of the U.S. to contain its 
spread.  Southeast Asia was at the front lines of this new battle and Thailand found itself, 
once again, directly in the middle.  The threat of communism affected Thailand on all its  
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borders, including the south.  Indigenous communist parties arose in both Thailand 
(Communist Party of Thailand, CPT) and in Malaysia (Malaysian Communist Party, 
MCP).   
Toward the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, Thailand’s separatist 
problem increased.  In fact, Malay-Muslim separatism in Thailand reached somewhat of a 
peak in the late 1960s.  Some experts attribute this spike to increased Thai military 
activity in the region (attributed to the fight against the communists) and in part to the 
economic recession engineered by the decline in world rubber prices.51  Regarding 
communism and separatism, what concerned the RTG the most was the linkage of the 
two movements.  In fact, that threat came in 1963 when the guerillas of the Malayan 
Peoples Liberation Army, the military wing of the MCP, began to seek recruits from the 
Thai Malay population.52  The linkage between the two movements never really 
materialized.  The attributed reason was the suspicion of “outsiders” by the Muslims in 
the south.53 
Policies developed by the prime minister of the time, Thanom 
Kittikachorn, were effective in temporarily reducing separatist activities.  He instituted 
policies to develop the economy and to extend basic utilities, such as access to electricity 
and water.  This forced the separatists to find other means to finance themselves and their 
activities and thus they resorted to extortion and kidnapping.  The response by the RTG 
was to rid the nation of these groups.     
By 1970, the RTG either killed or jailed most of the southern separatist 
movement leadership.  This in turn, once again, escalated the violence between the 
separatists and the central government throughout the 1970s.  One incident that incensed 
the Muslim community occurred in 1975 when a bomb was thrown into a crowd of 
40,000 protesters in Pattani, killing 11 and injuring 44.54  On that day, southerners were 
protesting the killing of five Muslim villagers by government troops when the bomb was                                                  
51 Andrew Forbes, Thailand’s Muslim Minorities, Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence? Asian 
Survey, Vol 22, No. 11. (Nov 1982), 1061.  
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thrown into the crowd.  Reportedly, the perpetrators were right-wing Buddhist 
sympathizers.  This led to more reprisals by the separatists.  Two bombs were detonated 
at Don Muang airport, but no one was injured.  However, it was the attempted 
assassination of the King and Queen on 27 September 1977 that really signaled how 
serious and how dangerous the southern situation had become.  On that day, five 
spectators were killed and 47 others injured, but the King and Queen were not harmed.55 
From the 1980s to the 1990s, under the leadership of Prime Ministers 
GEN Prem Tinsulanonda and Chatichai Choonvahan, a conciliatory posture was taken 
toward the south.  This brought some semblance of peace to the region.  In particular, it 
was GEN Prem’s leadership that caused the violent death spiral southern Thailand was on 
to subside; in political science terms, there was a decrease in the security dilemma 
between the RTG and the separatists under GEN Prem’s leadership.   
While still dealing with the communist insurgency within Thailand, GEN 
Prem instituted Order Number 66/23 (“The Policy to Win Over the Communists”) and 
Order Number 65/25 (“Plan for the Political Offensive”).56  Order Number 66/23 was 
primarily used to establish the political offensive against the CPT and Order 65/25 was 
more for implementation.  GEN Prem also established the 43rd Civil-Police-Military Joint 
Headquarters (CPM 43) and the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center 
(SBPAC).  These two organizations were established in Yala province to solve problems 
relating to both the communist and separatist movements in the southern border 
provinces.  The CPM43 was assigned to suppress and to subdue all terrorist movements.  
The SBPAC was designed to supervise and oversee all problems that either had a 
political tone or a psychological-social aspect.   
GEN Prem’s policies had an immediate effect.  By the mid-1980s, the 
CPT was basically defeated.  Reports of CPT activity started to disappear by the early 
1990s.  The exact fate of the party is really not known.  Terrorist attacks or separatist 
violence against the state during the same period significantly decreased as well.  Liow 
lists three developments that reduced southern violence in the 1980s and early 1990s: It 
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was the establishment of the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center 
(SBPAC), the attempts to develop the region economically and industrially, and the 
democratization of Thai politics in the 1980s that afforded a voice to the Malay-Muslim 
community in government.57  
Throughout the 1990s, southern separatism was not an issue for the RTG.  
Attacks were sporadic and not that eventful.  Therefore, a decision was made by PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra in May 2002 to disband both of the organizations that were 
responsible for keeping the peace in the south, CPM43 and SBPAC.58  Subsequently, he 
handed over authority to the Royal Thai police, giving them the upper-hand in managing 
the south, creating an even deeper chasm between the RTA and the police. The reasons 
for dissolving these organizations remain unknown.   
One possibility for giving the Royal Thai Police the lead role in managing 
the southern situation could be Prime Minister Thaksin’s affinity for the police force.  As 
a former police officer himself, he still maintains an extensive network of contacts within 
the force.  This close relationship with the police and the repeated feedback that the 
situation in the south was “quiet,” could have caused Prime Minster Thaksin to be lulled 
into a false sense of peace by the Royal Thai police.  The other possibility is his 
cooptation of the military apparatus has led to the creation of military “yes men.”  In an 
interview with Konkarnmuang magazine, August 2002, GEN Kitti talks about this 
cooptation of the military, he is quoted as saying, “commanders of each of the military 
departments wait for orders from the politicians.  There are no recommendations given to 
the government.  This will negatively affect the state.”59  
Since becoming PM in 2001, PM Thaksin has affected the Thai polity in 
many ways.  One such way is the “repoliticizing”60 of the military, returning them to the 
political sphere.  Seemingly, this had a debilitating effect on them professionally.  Not 
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allowing professional officers to speak their minds for fear of reprisal (such as being 
passed over for promotion or being removed prematurely from post) obviously corrodes 
loyalty and effectiveness of the corps.   
C. RECENT RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
1. Trends 
As mentioned in the introduction, southern Thailand has erupted in flames once 
again.  The violence occurring in recent years can be traced to their beginnings in 2001.  
By 1999, many pundits stated the security situation, the separatist operations in Southern 
Thailand, was finally over.  After years of silence, generally no major incidents of 
violence had occurred in a decade or so in southern Thailand.  However, the silence was 
broken in April 2001 when bombs erupted at the Hat Yai train station in Songkhla 
province and in a separate attack, a bomb exploded at a hotel in Yala province.  
Throughout 2001, sporadic violence continued to percolate.  However, by December 
2001, the southern insurgents seemed bolder and brasher.  As in the past, the militants 
had begun to strike directly against Royal Thai forces, specifically Royal Thai Police 
forces.  On 24 December 2001, five well coordinated attacks took place in the three 
troubled border provinces, Patani, Yala, and Naratiwat.  The attacks were nearly 
simultaneous, and displayed much greater sophistication than previous raids.61  
By July 2002, “19 policemen were killed and seven seriously injured while the 
casualties of other non-police officers and workers were three deaths and three injuries.  
The weapons seized by the gangsters include 54 rifles, shotguns and pistols, with 
approximately 4,000 rounds of ammunition and two two-way radios.”62  
Throughout 2002 and 2003, random acts of violence occurred.  Schools were 
targeted and burned.  In August 2003 alone, 34 schools were set ablaze.63  Additionally 
throughout the year, more police were shot and killed.  However, the most violent period, 
since the resurgence of violence in the south, was in the one-year period from January 
through December 2004; more than 600 Thais, civilians, military, religious leaders, and 
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separatists alike were victimized by acts of violence and terror in southern Thailand.  All 
the acts of violence occurred in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Naratiwat.  Tracking statistics, from 1993 to 2003, there were 72264 insurgency related 
incidents (rising from 50 in 2001 to 75 in 2002, and 119 in 200365).  In 2004 alone, from 
January to November, there were 1,253 violent incidents in the south.66  The reason for 
the drastic increase in 2004 follows.   
During the early morning hours of January 4, 2004, southern Thailand was once 
again under siege.  At about 0100 hours, simultaneous attacks occurred throughout the 
southern provinces of Naratiwat, Yala, and Pattani.  When sunrise finally came, it was 
evident what happened - over 20 schools were torched, several police posts fire-bombed, 
and more importantly, over 400 small arms, mostly M-16 automatic rifles, were stolen 
from a Royal Thai Army (RTA) depot in Naratiwat at the Rajanakarin Army camp in the 
Joh Airong district.   
Estimates are that 100 to 150 insurgents overran the RTA depot in a remarkable 
display of operational sophistication.  A coordinated event such as this had never taken 
place before in the south.  The unknown group used diversionary tactics, such as false 
bombs and setting tires on fire in alternate locations, to mask the heist at the RTA 
armory.  Since the heist, no one has been captured or indicted in connection with the 
January incident.  Additionally, the weapons have yet to be recovered.   
Only four months later, on 28 April 2004, the next major event took place.  In a 
single day, Thailand lost over 100 citizens in probably the second bloodiest day in 
modern Thai history.  On that day, 107 insurgents were killed, 17 arrested, and 5 Thai 
security officials died.    
As in January, insurgents, many of them apparently suicidal teens, launched 
simultaneous pre-dawn raids on 10 police outposts and a police station in a military-style 
operation.  Wielding machetes, and some carrying guns, the insurgents attacked police 
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posts in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat.  During the attacks, there 
were reports the insurgents were overheard yelling, "We are ready to die for God!" as 
they stormed outposts.67  Not knowing how to respond to the attacks, Thai security forces 
defended themselves by returning fire on the attackers.  After the incident, reports 
surfaced that excessive use of force was used by Thai police and RTA personnel 
During that day’s events, the most disturbing incident took place at one of the 
south’s most sacred mosques, the Krue Se Mosque.  Thai security forces were faced with 
a severe dilemma.  Within the mosque, were 32 insurgents armed with rifles and other 
weapons poised to secure their position.  In a miscalculated decision by the deputy 
commander of the Internal Security Operation Command, General Pallop Pinmanee, gave 
the order to attack the mosque.  In doing so, all 32 insurgents were killed on site.  He was 
later quoted as saying, “I was afraid that as the crowd got bigger, the situation would pose 
an even greater security risk.  I had no choice.  I was afraid that as time passed the crowd 
would be sympathetic to the insurgents, to the point of trying to rescue them."68  In a 
stroke of bad irony, it was on this day, some 56 years earlier, in 1948, this same mosque 
had witnessed violence that exceeded the violence in 2004.   
 The last major event in 2004 was the Tak Bai incident in October 2004, when 85 
Thai protesters were killed by the Thai government, 78 dying of suffocation during 
transportation to a military detention center.  On that day, approximately 3,000 or so local 
citizens of the Tak Bai district, in Naratiwat province, were protesting the arrest of a 
several locals who where detained by the RTA on suspicion of providing state-issued 
weapons to local Islamic militants.69  After the crowd became rowdy and aggressive, 
shots were fired.  It is unknown who shot first, but Thai security officials returned fire, 
killing five of the protestors, thus escalating the situation.   
Once the crowd had subsided, Thai officials apprehended approximately 1,300 
protesters and prepared to transport them 130 kilometers to the 4th Army Region 
Forward Command in Pattani’s Nong Chik district.  While in custody, the protestors were 
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bound and stuffed into awaiting military vehicles and taken to Nong Chik district.  
During transport, 78 of them suffocated.   
By the end of 2004, approximately 600 Thais either directly related to or 
associated with violence in southern Thailand were killed.  It would turn out to be one of 
the bloodiest years in modern Thai history.  The most unfortunate part is there has yet to 
be any concrete leads as to who was behind the violence.  Moreover, no signs exist that 
the violence is near the end of its life-cycle either. 
2. The Actors 
As previously discussed, GAMPAR was the first “organized” group dedicated 
toward the plight of the southern Malay-Muslims.  However, the first truly organized 
separatist group to form was the Barisan National Pember-basan Patani (BNPP).  The 
BNPP was formed in 1959.  Their aim has been to establish an independent and 
sovereign Islamic state of Pattani through political, psychological, diplomatic, and 
military means.70  The BNPP is the oldest Muslim separatist organization in Thailand.  
Recruitment was conducted primarily through religious teachers who have extensive 
connections outside Thailand in Malaysia and the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and even Palestine.71  By 1990, the name of the movement was changed to the 
BIPP (Barisan Islam Pember-Basan Pattani).  The major reason for the name change 
came after the Iranian uprising in 1979.  By adding the word “Islam,” they stressed the 
point of “Islamization.”  BIPP is believed to have been involved in some attacks during 
the most recent violence in southern Thailand.  
The next group to form was the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional).  They emerged 
on the separatist scene in Thailand in the early 1960s in response to the RTG’s 
educational reform program, which made the traditional schools, pondoks, teach secular 
subjects.  The BRN was more focused on political organization than guerilla tactics; 
however, this did not mean they were adverse to violence.  The aim of BRN has been to  
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create an independent republic of Patani out of the four majority Muslim provinces in 
southern Thailand (Patani, Yala, Naratiwat, and Satun).72  The BRN are still in existence 
today.   
The most well known group is the Pattani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO).  PULO came into being in 1968 and has emerged as the largest and most well 
known separatist group in Thailand.  Their ideology lies somewhere between BNPP and 
BRN.  They believe in “Religion, Race/Nationalism, Homeland, and Humanitarianism” 
and have stated their goal was an independent state characterized more by ethno-
nationalism, than Islamism.73  As with the other groups, PULO is well connected 
regionally and overseas.  In fact, most of PULO’s senior leaders were based in Mecca, 
Saudi Arabia, and their military operations headquartered in Tumpat, Kelantan, Malaysia.   
A newer player on the Thai separatist scene is Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani 
(GMIP).  They were formed in 1995 by a Thai national who fought in the Afghan War as 
a Mujahidin fighter.  The founder, Nasoree Saesang, trained with Nik Adili Nik Aziz, son 
of PAS Chairman Nik Abdul Aziz Mat.74  (More information about this relationship is 
discussed in Chapter III, “Thailand’s Border Problem and The Malaysian Connection.”)  
GMIP’s goal is to also create an independent Patani, and it appears to be more closely 
linked to international Islamists than the other Thai separatists groups.  In fact, reports 
state this group was behind the distribution of leaflets in Yala province in 2001, calling 
for a jihad and for support of Osama bin-Laden.75 
Finally, there is Bersatu (the United Front for the Independence of Pattani).  This 
is an umbrella organization, which was initially established in 1989,76 went dormant for a  
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while, but resurfaced in 1997.  Bersatu loosely coordinates political issues and sets the 
ideology for four of Thailand’s separatists groups: PULO, New PULO, GMIP and 
BRN.77    
New PULO was established in 1995 as a dissident faction of PULO, whose goal 
is self-autonomy, but achieved through less dramatic albeit more consistent means.78  
From 1995 to 1998, New PULO conducted regular small-scale bombings, incendiary 
attacks, and shootings on a regular basis.  A favorite target is schools, symbols of Thai 
oppression.  It is reported that New PULO hires young drug addicts to conduct the 
majority of their attacks.79  This makes tactical and strategic sense, since there is an 
abundant number of “available” youth in the south and if one of them is captured, it is 
highly unlikely he would possess any real knowledge of the group’s operations.  A quote 
from Peter Chalk about the linkage of PULO and New PULO, “the organizations did 
agree to form a tactical alliance in mid-1997 in an attempt to refocus national and 
regional attention on the southern question.”80   
No one, not the RTG, the USG, nor academia, knows who is behind the latest 
resurgence of violence in southern Thailand.  However, by analyzing the methods, past 
history, and tactics of the attacks, and by looking at what targets were hit and their 
ideologies, as well as the means of delivering the violence, all indications apparently 
suggest that PULO, GMIP, and New PULO as being behind the recent upsurge of 
violence in the south.     
D. CONCLUSION 
History is a major factor behind the violence in southern Thailand.  The Royal 
Thai government has been dealing with the situation in the south for nearly two centuries.  
W.K. Che Man has proposed a hypothesis for the causes of Muslim separatism in 
southern Thailand, which is supported by the aforementioned analysis.  Che Man first 
states that the problem is derived from what is perceived as “internal colonization” by the 
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Thai-Buddhists over the Malay-Muslims, or what some scholars have referred to as the 
“Siamization” of the south.  Che Man notes that Siam’s main concern in Patani was not 
religious conversion, but political domination.81  He concludes that the problem is more a 
“conflict of cultures” that is inspired and legitimized in religious terms, therefore giving it 
more of a cultural hue, than an economic one.82   
Disputing Che Man’s conclusions is easy.  However, what is not disputable is that 
the violence has returned and has returned with a vengeance.  If using the data provided 
by Supara Janchitfah and the ICG report, violence in the southern has increased by about 
1000% and that is in just one year, 2004.  The actors who are suspected to be behind the 
violence (possible, PULO, GMIP, and New PULO) do not seem to be decreasing their 
activity.  One aspect that seems to exacerbate the problems in the south is the linkage to 
regional players.  Specifically, southern separatists being linked to Malaysia’s radical, 
Islamic political party, Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS), which is based in Malaysia’s 
northern province of Kelantan.  This linkage is discussed in the next chapter, “The 
Malaysia Connection.”    
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III. THAILAND’S BORDER SECURITY CHALLENGE AND THE 
MALAYSIA CONNECTION  
This chapter focuses on the physical and political relationship between Thailand 
and Malaysia and analyzes the border region between the two nations, particularly the 
porous nature of the Thai-Malay border.  It then examines how dual citizenship 
aggravates the situation in southern Thailand.  Lastly, it discusses the “Malaysian 
Connection,” and the role of external players, in particular the Parti Islam se-Malaysia 
(PAS) in the southern Thailand problem.   
This thesis argues that securing the Thai-Malay border is vital to reducing the 
violence in southern Thailand.  Additionally, this thesis also contends that the Malaysian 
government is generating an “enabling effect” on the southern Thai separatism and the 
Malaysian government must be active participants in order to reduce the violence in the 
south.  
A. THE POROUS THAI-MALAYSIAN BORDER & DUAL CITIZENSHIP  
General Discussion on Transmigration in Southeast Asia 
The free flow of people throughout Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon.  It 
is a common practice especially for migratory workers between Indonesia and Malaysia 
or the Philippines and Indonesia.  Additionally, this movement of people occurs at border 
crossings throughout the region.  For instance, merchants cross the border to buy and sell 
food products and materials daily.  This practice generates a serious problem for the 
nations of Southeast Asia.  It forces them to choose between national security and 
economic consideration.   
Regarding national security, it behooves Southeast Asian countries to ensure that 
terrorists or criminals are not freely crossing their borders.  Yet, economically, if these 
nations tried to limit the number of migratory workers, whether legal or illegal, the cost 
to secure their borders could severely strain their fiscal resources.  Additionally, the 
economic strain would not simply come from the money spent regulating their borders, 
but possibly from lost foreign remittances as well.  Therefore, ironically, sealing their 
borders is not in the best interest of Southeast Asian nations.  
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A report by the Human Rights Watch Group, titled, “Help Wanted: Abuses 
against Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Indonesia and Malaysia,” estimates that 
around two million Indonesians may currently be working in Malaysia and that Indonesia 
receives up to U.S.$5.49 billion in remittances from migrant workers per year.83  How 
many of these workers are there legally is difficult to verify, as more than half may be 
undocumented workers without valid work permits or visas.  As for Thailand, in 1999 
total foreign remittances accounted for approximately 56 billion Baht, which is 
equivalent to about $1.4B USD.84  Also, during that same year, close to 18,000 Thais 
found migrant work in Malaysia.85  Therefore the economic strain of sealing these 
borders could adversely affect the countries involved.  This is especially true for 
countries that share a common border, in this case the Thai-Malay border.    
As with most countries in the region, Thai authorities face the daunting challenge 
of controlling several thousand kilometers of difficult-to-monitor borders.  Located at 
Thailand’s west and northwest is Burma.  In the 1980s, around 50% of Asia’s opium was 
produced in Burma, along with approximately 70% of Asia’s morphine and heroin 
production.86  Burma is also a mass producer of methamphetamines that primarily caters 
to the large markets in Thailand.87  Laos is to the north and northeast.  Its border often 
facilitates easy access into and out of Thailand by smugglers, drug dealers, and other 
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criminals.88  Finally, Cambodia runs along Thailand’s lower northeast border and 
Malaysia occupies the southern border.   
1. The Porous Thai-Malaysian Border 
The possibility of suspected terrorist, guerilla, and/or criminal groups seamlessly 
moving across borders creates a security dilemma for Southeast Asian countries and is a 
challenge to WoT.  Border security is a widespread problem throughout the region and at 
the Thai-Malay border.  Border security is difficult for many reasons: limited defense and 
police budgets, lack of operational capability in border-defense techniques, and a lack of 
equipment and/or technologies, just to name a few.   
The current situation in southern Thailand is exacerbated by the fact that the 
border between Thailand and Malaysia is somewhat of a no-man’s land.  In fact, Paul 
Smith calls the area around Thailand’s Kolok River “a sieve” for Thailand.89  Therefore, 
one of the crucial issues in alleviating the problem of cross-border operations by southern 
Thai militants is controlling the border between Thailand and Malaysia.  (See Figure 1 
for a map of the Kolok River region).   
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Figure 2. Kolok River Region90  
 
Over the years, the RTG has repeatedly stated that southern insurgents use the 
border for various reasons, such as conducting operations, and the RTG has accused the 
Malaysian government of not fully cooperating.91  In fact, the RTG has claimed on 
several occasions that the region just over the border is a training area for southern Thai 
militants, a claim the Malaysian government has vehemently denied on several 
occasions.92  
The RTG reports that insurgents cross the Thai-Malaysian border into Thailand, 
commit acts of violence, such as a car bombing, the burning of a school, or something as 
brash as the January 2004 arsenal heist, and immediately return to Malaya unabated by 
Malaysian authorities.  Besides the RTG’s claims of harboring training sites in the “no-
man’s land” between Thailand and Malaysia, it has also accused the Malaysian 
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government of allowing the militants to receive sanctuary and logistics support in 
Malaysia, specifically in the northern Malaysian states of Kelantan and Kedah.93   
In June 1985, W.K. Che Man, while writing his doctorial dissertation, was taken 
on a seven-day visit of BNPP headquarters located just within the Malaysian border.94  
With the approval of BNPP leadership, he was allowed access to the inter-workings of 
the organization.  During his visit, he documented a plethora of information that 
corroborates the RTG’s claims that southern insurgents are actively operating within 
Malaysia.   
Che Man observed the writing of pamphlets and propaganda in both Malay and 
Arabic.  Also, the Chairman of BNPP and other leaders reportedly were engaged in 
conducting political orientation and military training.95  Che Man attended a lecture given 
by BNPP’s chairman to a group of approximately 15 recruits who were attending a two-
week orientation course.  Moreover, during the visit, he was told how BNPP’s military 
arm had taken 12 other recruits out to a camp for a two-week guerilla training program.96   
Compounding the situation further is external funding.  Sources allege that funds 
transferred from at least two undisclosed Middle Eastern states have funneled to southern 
Thai militants or insurgents.97  The payments were deposited into Malaysian bank 
accounts and then carried as cash into Thailand and disbursed.      
2. Dual Citizenship 
In his essay, “Dual Ethnic Minorities and the Local Reworking of Citizenship at 
the Thailand-Malaysian Border,” Alexander Horstmann provides insight on dual 
citizenship and its affects on the people of southern Thailand, northern Malaysia and the 
Thai and Malaysian governments.  He reports that from the states’ perspective, holders of 
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dual citizenship are seen as “trouble makers whose practices of participating in more than 
one national polity are violating the concept of sovereignty.”98  Horstmann also discusses 
the unfortunate peripheral entities and the constructed inferior races at the border when 
he says, “The Patani Malays, the Thai-speaking Muslims in Satun in Thailand and the 
Kelantan Thais in Malaysia can be conceptualized as trapped minorities, who are trapped 
on the national border between a host but hostile state [Thailand], which reluctantly 
offers them citizenship, and an absent, scattered mother nation [Malaysia] with little 
political and economic weight.”99 
This “trap” took place when the Anglo-Siamese Treaty was signed in the first 
decade of the 20th century.100  Whether or not the practice of dual citizenship is just and 
should be kept in place is not contested and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  This 
region was divided when imperialism was at its peak.  Today the countries involved must 
deal with the lingering problems of colonization.  
Horstmann highlights the major source of contention in the Thai-Malay case: the 
movement of people across the southern Thai border, which happens almost despite 
state(s) regulation.101  Additionally he describes how the people of southern Thailand and 
northern Malaysia benefit from the compliance of the state, whose agents cooperate in 
border trade and in the barter of identity cards and work permits.102  This substantiates 
Paul Smith’s point about the border region as this “sieve” or no-man’s land where people, 
money, and goods flow freely without the governments seriously considering the 
consequences of their actions.   
Horstmann introduces an important point about dual citizenship: The states may 
see their diasporas as an extension of their cultural territory and hence ignore the practice 
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of dual citizenship.103  Both governments understand there is a border problem; however, 
they also understand dual citizenship is so controversial that neither government is ready 
to take on the fight that would ensue if they proposed a plan to abolish the practice.  
Horstmann concludes by saying, “The Malaysian government has a more ambiguous 
relationship to the Muslim Diaspora in Thailand.”  The reason for the Malaysian 
government’s “ambiguity” is it understands it must stay neutral on the issue of minority 
rights in southern Thailand.  This is an internal Thai problem that must be dealt with 
according to Thai law.   
Without the proper mechanisms in place to control the flow of people and/or the 
materials that cross the Thai-Malay border, both governments will continue to be affected 
adversely.  This unabated flow of people across the border provides the conditions for 
insurgents to across the border and it allows them to conduct the types of operations that 
were discussed in Chapter II.   
Because the acts of violence are not occurring on Malaysian soil and according to 
the ASEAN norms of non-interference, 104 the Malaysian government cannot and should 
not become involved in rectifying what is an internal Thai problem.  However, this does 
not exclude the Malaysian government from sealing its side of the border to assist the 
RTG when called upon.   
Malaysia’s perceived lassie-fare attitude toward the problem carries heavy 
implications for the RTG, especially when incidents occur along the border or within the 
provinces of Patani, Yala, or Naratiwat.  If the central Malaysian government does not 
dedicate manpower, police, or military forces, or intelligence gathering to assist the RTG, 
the situation will worsen before it becomes better.   
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The Nation newspaper summed it up perfectly when it reported:  
Today, an artificial border-a legacy of the colonial past but a very 
important entity of any sovereign state-divides them. But for Bt10, one 
can cross the Kolok River on a small boat instead of going through the 
time-consuming immigration checkpoint on the nearby bridge. In some 
locations, like Narathiwat's Waeng district, villagers walk back and forth, 
passing boundary markers as if they weren't there. And so when an 
incident occurs on either side of the border, it takes no rocket scientist to 
figure out where a state's jurisdiction ends and where the border of another 
country begins.105 
B. THE MALAYSIAN CONNECTION 
1. Thai-Malay Relations 
Critical to the RTG’s success in dampening the affects of cross-border operations 
is a close working relationship with the Malaysian government.  This bilateral 
relationship must be strong in order for either side to put forth a serious and successful 
counter-insurgency operation. This next section analyzes the “Malaysian Connection,” 
the current bilateral relationship between the Thai and Malaysian governments and the 
role PAS plays in southern Thailand.   
Thai – Malaysian Bilateral Relations 
Historically, Thai-Malaysian relations have been fairly amicable.  In terms of 
fighting for a common cause, Thai-Malaysian relations were probably at their peak 
during the communist insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s.  As briefly discussed in 
Chapter II, they understood in order to defeat communism, as they did, it was essential to 
have strong bilateral cooperation.  This relationship allowed them to draft agreements 
that led to highly successful counter-insurgency operations.   
One of the agreements was the decision to allow “hot pursuit” into each other’s 
territory.106  Another successful arrangement came on 4 March 1977 when they signed 
the Thai-Malaysia Border Agreement.107  This agreement made possible unilateral 
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military strikes against the MCP across either side of the border for short periods of time 
and of limited depth as authorized by the regional Border Committee.  The agreement 
also combined military operations under a joint commander acceptable to both sides.   
Therefore, this proves that putting aside differences and making a concerted effort 
to solve a common problem or having a common goal has positive results.  The 
communist insurgency in both Thailand and Malaysia was eradicated by the mid-
1980s.108   
However, their relationship has also had its low points as well.  There have been 
numerous disagreements between the two nations over their history and there are issues 
that are still lingering until today.  Illegal migration (briefly discussed in this chapter), 
piracy in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, illegal fishing, and concerns over 
territorial claims are just a few of these disagreements.109  However, the gravest problem 
for Thai-Malay relations in recent history, especially after the events of 2004, is Muslim-
separatism and militant insurgency in southern Thailand.    
Even during the communist insurgency campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Malay-Muslim chasm had to be handled very gingerly.  Malaysia was opposed to 
introducing anti-Muslim overtones into any agreement with the Thais.110  They were 
fearful that agreements containing such overtones would create difficulties in public 
opinion within Malaysia and possibly damage international relations, especially with 
other Islamic countries.  Additionally, anti-Muslim overtones could have created the 
allusion that the Malaysian government was collaborating with Thailand against Muslim 
coreligionists.111  The RTG understood this concern and did not add anti-Muslim caveats 
into their agreements. 
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It is important to keep in mind that the communist movement was an ideological 
movement whereas the issue of Muslim separatism takes on more of an ethno-
religious112 feature.  It could prove disastrous to the Malaysian government if they were 
perceived to be siding with the RTG on how to deal with the problem of Muslim 
insurgency.   
An effective counter-insurgency operation requires a strong Thai-Malay 
relationship.  To prove this point, as described in his recent article, “Unrest in Southern 
Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001,” Aurel Croissant states that 
in respect to the Malay-Muslim situation in southern Thailand, it may take the support of 
other nations, in particular, Malaysia, for conflict resolution.113   
After about 30 months or so into this new wave of violence in southern Thailand, 
indications are that Thai-Malay relations have hit another low.  The first real signs of 
stress occurred in early April 2004 when Prime Minister Thaksin accused Malaysia of not 
doing enough to assist Thailand with its border problems.  This was about three months 
after the January 2004 armory heist incident and before the events of 28 April 04 (the 
militant uprising where over 100 Malay-Muslims were killed and the Krue Se Mosque 
incident).   
Without hard evidence, PM Thaksin accused Malaysia of harboring terrorists and 
allowing militant training camps to exist just within the border of Malaysia.114  
Accusations of harboring terrorists and allowing training camps are an ongoing debate in 
Thai-Malay relations dating back decades.  However, what was surprising and shocking 
was the strong reaction from senior cabinet members of the Malaysian bureaucracy.  
Malaysian Defense Minster, Najib Tun Razak said, “You have made the remarks; now 
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give us the information.”  He also stated, “If you give us information, we can act on it 
what is necessary now is not more statements but accurate and timely intelligence.”115   
The Malaysian government wanted proof that militants or insurgents were being 
sheltered in Malaysia.  However, the RTG could not deliver the evidence.  From this 
point forward, a new round of finger pointing between the two nations ensued and PM 
Thaksin showed the first real signs of frustration from what he perceived as a the lack of 
cooperation (or lassie-fare attitude) from Malaysia.   
As 2004 progressed and as the violence continued, more barbs were thrown at 
each other.  Accusations by the RTG against the Malaysian government were becoming 
more frequent.  The response from the Malaysian government and from prominent 
Malaysian officials was out of the ordinary.  Both sides began to show signs of weariness 
over the southern Thai problem.   
Malaysia’s concern for the situation in southern Thailand emerged after the Tak 
Bai incident.  More outraged Malaysian officials spoke out, bucking the ASEAN norm of 
non-intervention, and condemned the actions of the RTG.   
Malaysia's former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad proposed autonomy for 
the south.  He stated, “This is like the Palestinian issue, if settled early, there will be no 
problems.  But the situation will get difficult if it is left to the command of the local 
army."116  Another leading figure in Malaysian politics, Anwar Ibrahim, formerly jailed 
Malaysian opposition leader said, “Thaksin's initial reaction seems to be pathetic-to 
completely ignore the problems, and to be so arrogant."117  Anwar’s statement was in 
reference to PM Thaksin’s remark, “Protesters died because they were in a weak physical 
condition resulting from fasting (Ramadan).  They just collapsed in the crowded situation 
and anti-riot forces did not touch them.”118   
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Then in December 2004 a mysterious photo was printed in the Thai media that 
displayed several men dressed in fatigues, wearing head scarves, and one man touting 
what seemed to be an automatic weapon.  The Thai government believes this photo 
substantiates their claim Thai separatists are actively training in northern Malaysia.  Thai 
deputy interior ministry at the time, Sutham Saengprathum, told reporters, "We have the 
pictures to prove that they have militia training in Kelantan state."119  
However, as of today, the exact location of the picture is still unknown.  
Additionally, there is no evidence the picture was taken at a site either in southern 
Thailand or northern Malaysia.  Further, there is no evidence the personnel in the picture 
are Thais or Malaysians.  What the picture does prove is the fear that is instilled by the 
border area.   
2. The Role of the Malaysian Government 
As alluded to in this chapter, an ongoing academic debate exists concerning 
Malaysian support for the southern insurgents.  The debate is the Malaysian government, 
more precisely members of the Malaysian polity, the “fervent”120 Islamic party Parti 
Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) are either a major backer of, or at the very least, contributing to 
the perpetual violence and the unabated flow of activity over the Thai-Malay border.  
Because of their long historical ties to the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand, this 
thesis supports the debate that PAS is involved and that they are providing some form of 
cover for the insurgent’s operations.   
a. History and Ideology of PAS 
Over the years, PAS has transformed itself from a moderate Islamic-
nationalist party in the 1960s and 1970s into what it is today, a more radical Islamic 
party.  According to PAS’ rhetoric, they have developed into a party that wants to 
establish an Islamic state, implement Sharia law and Hudud, and wants the primacy of 
the Ulama in society.121  Throughout their development, PAS has successfully politicized 
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Islam in Malaysian politics, especially against its rivals, the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) party, the senior partner of the National Front.122    
PAS broke away from UMNO in the late 1950s.  They started as the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and changed their name to PAS in 1971.123  Therefore, 
PAS was formed from the same “crucible”124 as the dominant UMNO party, but as they 
progressed, their ideology changed.   
PAS started out as a marginalized party struggling for a home in 
Malaysian politics.  But, over time, they developed a complex and dynamic ideology 
combining progressive Islamism, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, transforming the 
party into a fairly leftist, Islamic Malay-Muslim opposition party.125  PAS was the first 
Islamic party in Asia to win a democratic election when in 1959 they took the two 
northern Malaysian states of Terengganu and Kelantan.126   
Because Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society, where ethnic Malays 
constituted just under 50% of the population in the 1960s, deep cleavages emerged within 
the National Front over matters such as education and minority representation in federal 
elections.  In 1969, PAS used these cleavages to establish a following and further 
capitalized on the ethnic, racial, and social nexus that emerged within Malaysia after the 
race riots of that year.  At the 1969 elections, PAS was successful in gaining a 
considerable grass-roots following by reiterating its “crusade for Malay rights into which 
Islam was subsumed”127 and by establishing an Islamic state based on Malay 
supremacy.128 
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In the 1970s, PAS lost some of its focus and some of their support.  They 
were more preoccupied with Malay communitarian rights then focusing on progressive 
Islamism and anti-colonialism.129  In order to reorient their party, PAS leadership looked 
abroad for models to emulate.  PAS looked at both Pakistan and Iran as examples.  This 
allowed the “ulama faction” of the party under the leadership of men like Yusof Rawa, 
Nik Aziz, Fadzil Noor, and Hadi Awang to take control.  Subsequently, PAS’ ideology 
was “Islamicized” once again and party leadership was centered under the ulama.130  
Until today, PAS remains the main opposition in Malaysian politics.   
The following is PAS’ ideology taken from their The Islamic State 
Document:131 
PREAMBLE: 
1. Islam is both a belief system and a deen - which is a complete and 
comprehensive way of life. 
3. PAS takes full cognizance of the reality and sensitivity of this country’s 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural makeup.  Hence from its 
inception, PAS has stated in no uncertain terms, its stance on the status 
and position of Islam as a comprehensive system of life embracing the 
entire domain of socio-political life. 
5. As an Islamic political party, PAS advocates the implementation of 
Islam as a comprehensive way of life, utilizing the vast principles and 
provisions of the Shari’ah, as a method to establish the Islamic State and 
Government.  
15. Unless an Islamic State is established, the true import and demands of 
this conviction could not be realized in its entirety. 
THE CONCEPTION (TASAWWUR) OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: 
From the understanding that Islam is a comprehensive way of life that 
pertains to both its character as a religion and a state (Deen and Daulah), 
the conception of an Islamic State is derived.   
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It is an embodiment of the principles and ideals of Islam in all aspects of 
life, both at the national and international levels. A typical conception of 
the state includes: 
- The Shari’ah is the main source of guidance and governance in 
conducting the affairs of the state. 
- The implementation of Shari’ah, hudud being a part of it, provides the 
much required peace and security as crimes would be reduced to its 
minimum. 
“As to the thief, male or female, Cut off his or her hands: punishment by 
way of example, from Allah.  For their crime: And Allah is Exalted in 
Power, Full of Wisdom.” – Surah Al-Maaidah :38 
The above stated injunction is mandatory and must be implemented. 
PAS’ idea of an Islamic state is in direct conflict with the central 
Malaysian government’s ideology for the state.  Because of PAS’ close proximity with 
Thailand and its shared history, PAS’ ideology significantly influences the border 
population of southern Thailand, and it has negatively affected the southern separatist 
movement as well.  Southern Thai separatist ideology mirrors PAS’ ideology.  They want 
to develop an “Islamic State” based on Sharia law and Hudud.  Therefore, it is no 
surprise that southern Thai separatist ideology is in direct conflict with the Buddhist 
dominant central Thai government.   
b. PAS’ Political Links to Southern Separatism and Militancy 
Politically, PAS has always been very attentive to the ethnic struggles of 
the Thai Malay-Muslims.  In the past, Patani Muslim leaders who held Malaysian 
citizenship joined PAS and expressed support for Patani to separate from the Kingdom of 
Thailand.  In a rally in Kelantan in 1969, PAS President, Dato Mohammad Asri Haji 
Muda openly discussed “the prospect of an alternative Malay nation, comprising the 
Malay states of Malaya and those of Southern Thailand, should Malay collapse as a 
country.”132  At that same rally, he also stated that an alternative Malay nation should be 
comprised of the sultanates of the Malay Peninsula and of the Patani region in southern 
Thailand.133   
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In 1970, Dato Asri wrote an article in the London publication, The 
Muslim, claiming the struggle against Thai rule in southern Thailand was a holy war 
(jihad) and therefore deserved world-wide Muslim support.134  In June 1974 the issue of 
separatism was broached again in Malaysian politics when Dato Asri, who was now a 
cabinet member of parliament stated, “In our considered opinion, the demand for 
autonomy subject to certain conditions, for the southern Thai provinces, which the 
liberation front has put forward, deserves to be given a favorable reception.  It could 
constitute a sensible step towards peace and tranquility.”135   
Each time PAS has made overt statements concerning Thai separatism, the 
central Malaysian government has stepped in to repair any damage caused by PAS.  PAS’ 
involvement on these issues has obviously generated much consternation for the 
Malaysian government over the years.  The Malaysian government sympathizes with the 
plight of the southern Thais, but they understand becoming involved would be 
tantamount to political suicide and violates ASEAN norms.     
In the 1980s, the RTG was also suspicious of the central Malaysian 
government’s support for the separatists, especially with the arrival of Dr. Mahathir bin 
Mohamad as Malaysia’s new prime minister in 1981.  Dr. Mahathir was considered an 
extremist Muslim because of his abrasive style and his staunch nationalistic approach.  
The RTG feared him and feared his appointment would negatively influence the Muslim 
south.  Thai officials were quick to point out during the early 1980s southern Thai 
separatists were wearing uniforms and had food supplies that closely resembled those of 
the Malaysian Army.136  Dr. Mahathir assured the RTG that its suspicions were just that, 
suspicions, and that the militants were not being supported by the Malaysian Army. 
Outside of the political linkages between PAS and southern Thailand, the 
linkages between PAS and southern militancy are also fairly extensive.  A RAND 
Corporation report, “Muslim Separatist Movements in the Philippines and Thailand,” 
stated the external dimension of the separatist struggle “essentially relates to backing 
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from Islamic militants in northern Malaysia.”137  The RAND report also details the 
RTG’s repeated allegations that the groups in the south benefit from the provision of a 
“safe haven” in the state of Kelantan and support has come with the sanctioning of the 
province’s ruling Islamic Party (referring to PAS) as well as the official indifference of 
the Kuala Lumpur government.138   
For much of the 1990s, PULO and New PULO reportedly received most 
of PAS’ support.139  Thai intelligence alleges and the Malaysian government denies that 
several of Thailand’s southern insurgent groups, including PULO, are allowed to 
maintain operational and logistics bases in Kelantan.140  There is one more link to PAS 
that must be made, the linkage of the Aziz family, GMIP, and the Afghan war.   
As mentioned in Chapter II, in 1995 a new southern Thai separatist group, 
GMIP, emerged under Nasoree Saesang.  Nasoree was formerly trained in Libya and 
fought with the Afghan mujahidin in the early 1990s during the Afghan-Soviet War.  
While fighting with the mujahidin he gained crucial expertise and developed deep 
contacts with other Islamic organizations and separatist movements around the world.  
However, when in Libya he met another native Southeast Asian who shared the same 
ideology as him and the connection to PAS was strengthened.  Nasoree trained alongside 
Nik Adili Nik Aziz, the son of PAS Chairman Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat.141  Since 1991, 
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat has been detained in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act 
for involvement in a jihadist group, the Kelompok Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).142   
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This furthers the point that the connections between southern militancy 
and members of PAS are deep, have long historical roots, and reach the highest echelons 
of PAS hierarchy.   
C. CONCLUSION     
Three main points were raised in this chapter: the porous nature of the Thai-
Malay border, the role of dual citizenship, and the Malaysian connection, each having its 
own peculiar effect on the current and historical nature of the southern Thai insurgency 
issue.   
It can be concluded that the current dual-citizenship policy gives the southern 
insurgents an advantage by allowing them to move seamlessly across the southern Thai 
border despite the regulations of the state.  Abolishing this policy is out of the question 
however.  If the RTG proposed to abolish the policy, this could add to the already long 
list of alleged central Thai government “abuses” against the Malay-Muslims.   
Until concrete evidence surfaces that PAS is actively engaged in southern 
Thailand, it behooves the RTG to reduce their accusations of PAS’ support.  Accusing 
elected officials of backing suspected separatists or militants can undermine bilateral 
relations, as witnessed in 2004.  What is most important to the RTG at this time is 
maintaining close bilateral relations with Malaysia.     
Therefore, there is only one course of action the RTG has total control over, their 
side of the border.  It cannot be stressed enough how vital border security is to the region, 
internal Thai security, and reducing southern violence.   
By eliminating the border issue from the equation, the RTG can concentrate on 
other issues to resolve the southern problem, issues such as relative deprivation, the 
political exclusion of the Malay-Muslims, just to name a few.  Chapter IV discusses how 
emerging technologies can aid the RTG to manage their side of the border effectively.   
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IV. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Chapters II and III of this thesis described the current separatist movement in 
southern Thailand, analyzing the history of the southern separatist problem, the issue of 
the porous border between Thailand and Malaysia, the role of dual-citizenship, and some 
of the external factors that have aggravated the problems in the south.  The separatist 
situation in southern Thailand can be categorized as very dynamic, enveloping multiple 
dimensions: historical, ethno-religious, economic, political, and security.   
Chapter IV focuses on the security dimension of the conflict and proposes that 
leveraging emerging technologies against the southern separatists will provide another 
layer of protection, which could possibly reduce the instances of violence in southern 
Thailand.  Additionally, this technology can provide another measure of security at the 
Thai-Malay border, sealing it to some degree.   
Each of the technologies discussed in Chapter IV demonstrates how commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies can be integrated to fuse and display information into 
a real-time, tactical, coalition enabled command and control (C2) center - all of which is 
accomplished at relatively low-cost and with very little burden placed on the logistics 
system.  The emerging technologies that will be discussed are as follows:   
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)  
• Lighter than Air (LTA) Platforms  
• Unattended Air and Ground Sensors  
• Wireless-LAN, Meshed Technologies (WiFi-802.11) 
• Other technologies  
¾ Wearable Computing Devices (Tacticomps) 
¾ Language Translation Devices 
Lastly, within this chapter briefly discusses the NPS sponsored research and field 
experimentation program entitled the Coalition and Operating Area Surveillance & 
Targeting System (COASTS).  The COASTS program is focused on researching low-
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cost, state-of-the-art, rapidly scaleable airborne and ground communications equipment 
suites that integrate with COTS wireless network technologies.143  
Importance of Technology and the Royal Thai Air Force’s (RTAF) “Vision”   
In the book titled, Secessionist Ethnic Conflict in South and Southeast Asia, the 
author notes that the following is necessary for a secessionist movement to exist: “(a) a 
degree of in-group legitimation that endorses the aims and means of the conflict; (b) a 
credible military threat; and (c) some tangible or political support from external 
states.”144  In the case of Thailand, their external threat, in relation to internal security, 
comes from its “ethnic minority guerrilla forces”145 who are allegedly receiving support 
from external actors via the porous Thai-Malay border.   
Secessionist violence, which is one form of asymmetrical warfare, along with 
terrorism, illegal immigration, and arms and drugs trafficking are all recognized as major 
threats to security and stability.  As a consequence, homeland-defense missions such as 
border defense, coastal surveillance, high-value object protection and force protection 
now receive a higher priority in the U.S. and around the world.   
Countering asymmetrical threats as they relate to internal security requires the 
ability to perform various roles with high speed, small size, and reliable technology.  
These asymmetrical threats potentially challenge traditional command and control (C2) 
when applied to modern communication and sensor technology.146   Therefore, emerging 
technologies, such as UAVs and ground sensing devices all linked via wireless networks, 
present increased capability for security forces deployed to remote areas of operation and 
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This leads to a dynamic tactical battle rhythm (TBR) where execution collaboration and 
real-time feedback across the tactical information grid have the potential to synergize the 
commander’s intent.147   
For decades, the USG has understood that a technological advantage on the 
battlefield is a force multiplier for U.S. troops.  Organizations (military, security, or 
otherwise) that can adopt and promote new technologies clearly have a critical edge in 
“modern” warfare.148  Therefore, understanding this, the USG created the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to ensure technological superiority for 
U.S. military forces by “fostering innovation and pursuing high-payoff, frequently high-
risk projects” and ensuring that these emerging technologies and concepts can be 
transitioned into capabilities the U.S. military can employ.149  Most of the technologies 
listed in this chapter either were, or are still part of DARPA’s continuing research and 
development into emerging technologies.   
In early 2005, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), 
published two documents that indicated the RTAF’s and RTG’s vision for the future.  
Their desires are to develop a military that is more capable, leaner, and embraces 
technology.  The first document, “RTAF’s Operational Policy for Budget Year 2548,”150 
in the area of Operations Policy, CINC/RTAF calls for the RTAF to, “6.4.5 develop 
command and control capabilities by digitizing their system for command and control so 
that future requirements and developments can embrace technological advances which 
will move towards a Network Centric capability.”  CINC/RTAF proceeds to discuss in 
sub-items 6.4.8 and 6.4.10 how the RTAF should “work with allied nations on R&D” and 
how “R&D should match RTAF needs.”   
Another document that supports the RTAF’s intent to embrace and leverage 
technology, with the aim of increasing their effectiveness, was the RTAF’s “Ten Year 
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Vision (2003-2013).”151  This document was delivered to PM Thaksin on 23 April 2003, 
and it is a detailed record of the various disciplines the RTAF wants to focus on in the 
next ten years taking into account their fiscal constraints.  In the area of combat 
operations, the document outlines the RTAF’s requirements to identify imaging 
capabilities that work day or night and in all weather conditions.  Furthermore, it 
specifically addresses the RTAF’s desire to find a capable UAV platform to satisfy their 
reconnaissance needs.  Additionally, the paper talks about finding a low-cost, effective C2 
“sensor” and “situational awareness” capability.   
Therefore, it can be summarized, due to budget constraints and the changing 
nature of warfare, the RTAF and RTG are seeking to modernize their forces.  They are 
attempting to embrace technology by leveraging cost-effective solutions to R&D that will 
accomplish their goal of maintaining a secure nation.   
The COASTS program is a prime candidate to fulfill the RTG/RTARF’s 
requirements.  COASTS is designed around technology, especially COTS, which focuses 
on low-cost solutions for border defense.  A second benefit of COASTS and its enabling 
technologies is it reduces the manpower required to accomplish the same mission.  This 
translates into a smaller personnel footprint and ultimately less exposure for police and 
military forces to be placed in harm’s way.   
A. OVERVIEW OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES  
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
One well known emerging technology is the UAV.  The current military UAV 
market is divided into three general categories: medium-/high-altitude long-endurance 
(MALE/HALE) platforms, capable of staying aloft for approximately 24hrs and carrying 
payloads of 100kg to more than 500kg; tactical UAVs, with an endurance of 4 to 12hrs 
and payloads of 25 to 100kg; and a rapidly emerging requirement for small UAVs, 
including technology under development for micro-air vehicles.152   
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Before discussing UAVs, a formal definition of the term UAV is presented from 
Joint Publication 1-02:153 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-A powered, aerial vehicle that does not 
carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, 
can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-
ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not 
considered unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Brief History of UAV Development 
The U.S. military first dabbled in UAV technology during World War I.154  These 
early UAVs flew very erratically; however, the military recognized their potential in 
combat.  However, the war-ending armistice arrived before prototype UAVs could be 
deployed in combat and UAV technology was shelved until the late 1950s.   
The first “modern” UAVs trace back to the Ryan Aeronautical Company’s 
“Lightening Bug,” a derivative of their sub-sonic target drone, the Firebee.155  Lightening 
Bugs had a range of more than 2,400 miles, could fly above 65,000 feet, and had a top 
speed of 420 miles per hour.156  Lightening Bug UAVs saw action in China and North 
Korea.  During the Vietnam War, advancements were made, making the UAVs more 
maneuverable and equipping them with electronic countermeasures and jamming 
equipment to defend them from surface-to-air missiles and air interception.   
Scout UAV 
It would take two decades until UAV technology saw its next major advancement.  
This occurred in 1982 during the Arab-Israeli War when Israel employed a fleet of their 
indigenous “Scout” UAVs.  The Scout UAV was developed primarily to act as a decoy.   
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Propeller-driven with no firepower, it flew slowly and had limited range; however, it 
emitted a radar aperture of a much larger plane, fitting the Israeli air force’s needs 
perfectly.   
The mission of the Scout was to find Syrian missile sites and entice the Syrians to 
activate their radars.  This tactic allowed the Israeli air force to use manned bomber 
aircraft to destroy these sites.  The result was 15 out of 17 Syrian missile sites being 
destroyed, allowing the Israelis to fly unabated in the skies throughout the duration of the 
war.157  After seeing the operational capability of the Scout UAV, the USG worked 
collaboratively with the Israelis to develop the next generation UAV, “Pioneer.”   
 
 
Figure 3. Scout UAV158 
Pioneer UAV 
In the 1980s U.S. Military operations in Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya identified a 
requirement for an on-call, inexpensive, unmanned, over-the-horizon targeting, 
reconnaissance and battle damage assessment capability for local commanders.  In 1985, 
the Secretary of the Navy directed the acquisition of UAVs for fleet operations.  The 
initial system delivery was made in July 1986 and later deployed on board the battleship 
USS Iowa in late 1986.159  From there, Pioneer was added to the Marine Corps arsenal 
and eventually into the Army inventory by 1990.  Pioneer saw action in Operations 
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Desert Shield and Desert Storm where it flew over 300 combat missions, supporting 
combat operations and providing battlefield commanders critical intelligence 
information, thereby cementing UAV utility and importance in a combat environment.160  
Pioneer is still in use today and is presently employed by the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq, 
along with a proto-type UAV, Dragon Eye.   
 
Figure 4. Pioneer UAV161 
Global Hawk UAV 
The largest and most sophisticated U.S. UAV is the Global Hawk.  It was used in 
Afghanistan while still in the flight test stage during Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Global Hawk provided Air Force and joint warfighting commanders with more than 
15,000 images, flew more than 50 missions, and acquired 1,000 combat hours.162  Global 
Hawk is jet powered and has a cruising altitude of 65,000 feet.  It is fully autonomous, 
once mission parameters are programmed: the UAV can taxi, take off, fly, loiter on 
station capturing imagery, return and land on its own.163  It is a pure surveillance 
platform, carrying no weapons payload.   
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Figure 5. Global Hawk UAV164   
 
Predator UAV (RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9) 
The RQ-1 Predator is a long endurance, medium altitude unmanned aircraft 
system for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.  The MQ-1 is armed with AGM-
114 Hellfire165 missiles.  It performs a multi-role mission of armed reconnaissance and 
interdiction.  The Predator system first flew in 1994 and entered production in August 
1997.  Predator UAVs have been operational in Bosnia since 1995, where they have 
flown over 600 missions in support of NATO, UN and U.S. operations.166  Predators 
have also been deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The MQ-1 Predator achieved Initial Operating Capability 
(IOC) in February 2005.  
Predator B (MQ-9 Hunter/Killer).  In May 1998, the Predator’s capabilities were 
expanded.  System upgrades were made to improve the relief-on-station (ROS) system, 
which allows continuous coverage over areas of interest without any loss of time on 
station, secure air traffic control voice relay, Ku-band satellite tuning and implementation 
of an Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS).167   Additionally, its power-plant was 
upgraded and wing de-icing systems were added to enable year-round operations.   
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On 4 November 2002, six suspected al-Qaida members traveling in a vehicle in 
Yemen were killed by a Hellfire missile fired by a CIA controlled Predator.168  Among 
those reportedly killed was Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harethi, a key suspect in the October 
2000 attack in Yemen on the USS Cole.   
 
 
Figure 6. Predator UAV169   
 
For the purpose of defending or securing the Thai-Malay border, MALE/HALE platforms 
such as the ones just described are not feasible due to their high cost and inaccessibility.  
Therefore, understanding the vision of the RTG/RTARF, combining low-cost, state-of-
the-art, and using COTS technologies, it is prudent to look at mini- and micro-UAVs.     
Application at the Thai-Malay Border 
a.  Mini-UAVS   
For environments like the Thai-Malay border, one solution is to deploy a 
system that can be launched within minutes, is easy to operate, and is fairly covert—all 
features of mini-UAVs.  Mini-UAVs are generally classified as having a wing-span of 
less than four meters and a payload capacity less than 15kg.170   
The first mini-UAV was developed by Paul MacCready in 1987 when he 
developed the “Pointer” UAV, the first hand-launched, backpack-carried UAV.  Pointer 
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combined the airframe technology of a high-performance model sailplane with an electric 
motor and propeller, a consumer video camera, and a radio datalink.171   
As computer technology and components have reduced in size, so have 
UAVs.  Mini-UAVs use technologies that are used in everyday electronic devices, such 
as laptops to cell phones and GPS receivers.  Hand-launched mini-UAVs can now 
navigate autonomously and return automatically and its operator can track the UAV and 
control sensor pointing.  Additionally, mini-UAVs can store imagery on-board and a 
portable ground station can store maps, terrain databases, and hours of video.   
 
      
Figure 7. CyberDefense CyberBugTM UAV172    
Figure 8. COASTS Team Member Employing CyberBug during COASTS 
Deployment 2005 
 
b. Micro-UAVs or Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) 
Micro-UAV dimensions usually have a maximum length and width of 
150mm, weight lower than 100g, airspeed ranges between 10 to 20 m/s, and have flight 
endurance times of 15 to 30 minutes.173  The interest in micro flying machines had its 
origins with the notion that small, insect-like flying platforms could be devised for covert  
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operations; the CIA was rumored to have attempted to build a remotely controlled 
“dragonfly.”174  However, it was DARPA that became the main engine behind the 
advancement of MAV technology.   
In 1997, DARPA’s vision for MAVs was to deploy these platforms with 
individual soldiers for the purpose of reconnaissance and surveillance, battle damage 
assessment, targeting, or for other sensing purposes like detection of nuclear, biological, 
chemical agents.175  Unfortunately, as of 2004, their goal had yet to be reached.  DARPA 
concluded that MAVs were not suitable for outdoor environments.176  In discussing what 
role MAVs do fill, DARPA states, “The mission space for which size really does matter 
is ‘indoors and in confined spaces’ where the environment is controlled or at least 
protected.”   
 
     
Figure 9. Examples of MAVs177  
 
c. Role of the Mini-Tactical UAV & the Southern Thai Border 
The exponential growth of data collection systems available to the 
decision maker has had a profound affect on intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) collection, C2, and shared situational awareness (SSA).  The UAV, 
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in particular the mini-UAV, plays a vital role in “filtering” information available to the 
decision maker by providing and improving the decision maker’s capability of collecting 
and disseminating battlefield information.178   
Limitations do exist in ISR systems, as significant amounts of the data and 
intelligence collected rarely makes it to the tactical users in a timely manner, forcing 
them to make decisions based on incomplete information.  Additionally, tactical users 
more often than not have trouble interacting with intelligence systems due to their high 
mobility and the lack of robust supporting systems.179 “Local persistence” is one way of 
rectifying this shortfall and using UAVs can assist in this role.180   
Local persistence allows continuous availability of intelligence data.  This 
allows the on-site commander to access information obtained directly through organic 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISRT) units and distribute this 
information through an organic wireless network.  Integrated ISRT reduces the need for 
information to flow from the higher echelon down to the tactical unit by allowing them to 
collect, fuse, and disseminate their own information, and to better integrate and 
synchronize elements of the information operations effort.  
By collecting ISRT data through organic means, tactical war-fighters can 
immediately develop potential actions to neutralize or mitigate adversary action(s).  A 
local network supported by the integration of airborne sensor platforms such as mini-
UAVs can be fielded quickly due to the vast array of WLAN, sensors, and man-portable 
UAV systems now available from the commercial world.  Current COTS technology 
offers an affordable, mass-produced method for providing local persistence to the tactical 
military decision-maker and information operations planner.   
To conclude, the most important element of information to the tactical 
decision-maker, or on-sight commander, is the availability, type, timeliness, quantity, and 
finally the quality of information provided to make critical decisions.  By reviewing 
NASA’s UAV continuum in Figure 8 and superimposing the mission needs of the 
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RTARF/RTAF on to the continuum (the ability to work at close range in a tactical 
environment, done at low-cost), it can be concluded the tactical UAV (mini-UAV) is 
tailor-made for their mission requirements in southern Thailand.   
 
Figure 10. NASA’s UAV Categorization181   
 
2. Lighter Than Air (LTA) Platforms (Balloons/Aerostats)  
Generally, there are two forms of lighter-than-air vehicles (LTAs), airships or 
blimps, and aerostats.  Airships are traditionally manned, and use engines to maneuver.  
Aerostats are tethered, or moored to the ground182 by a cable that can also provide power.  
Historically, airships and aerostats have been used for military surveillance and anti-
submarine detection.183   
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Figure 11. Aerostat 
  
Figure 12. COASTS Balloon 
 
Airships were used extensively from the 1900s until about 1960.  In World War I 
approximately 100 airships were used on both sides of the war.  They ranged from the 
smaller (100,000 ft) non-rigid craft to larger (2.5 million ft) rigid craft.  In 1933, the 
Goodyear Zeppelin Corporation completed construction on two rigid airships, Akron and 
Macon, for U.S. Navy use.  These were the largest airships built during that era and two 
of the largest airships ever built.184  Both rigid and non-rigid airships were used 
extensively as long endurance, long-range platforms to carry payloads that are essentially 
fixed (constant weight).  But by the late 1930s, the popularity of the rigid airship declined 
due to several factors: their difficulty in managing excess buoyancy and applications with 
widely varying payload weights, the Hindenburg disaster, and the advent of commercial 
passenger airplanes.      
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However, because of some unique advantages over airplanes LTAs have been 
given new life.  For instance, they are superior for short distance hauling of very heavy or 
bulky cargo, they can be used in mineral detection and can also perform pollution watch.  
Undoubtedly, it is their surveillance role where LTA platforms perform optimally.   
In missions that require long endurance (“persistence”) in the air, such as certain 
types of border protection missions, as radar platforms, or as range extenders for WLAN 
(which will be discussed later), LTA craft, in particular aerostats, are critical to mission 
accomplishment.  Additionally, due to their low vibration and low noise levels, they are 
extremely beneficial for ISR missions in which video feeds are essential.    
In a 2004 report prepared for congress, it was reported that a number of developments 
have combined to draw increased attention toward LTA platforms:   
First, U.S. domination of airpower in military conflicts has been 
overwhelming since 1991. Threats to LTA platforms appear to be very 
low by historical standards. Second, the military’s demand for “persistent 
surveillance,” a function for which aerostats appear to be well suited, is 
growing. Network-centric warfare approaches, increased emphasis on 
homeland security, and growing force protection demands in urban 
environments all call for “dominant battle-space awareness.” Third, 
growing airlift demands have spawned studies on using airships as heavy 
lift vehicles. Fourth, growing budget pressures have encouraged the study 
of potential solutions to military problems that may reduce both 
procurement and operations and maintenance (O&M) spending. LTA 
platforms may fit into this category. Finally, recent advances in unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) command and control suggests that future airships 
may also be remotely piloted, or fly autonomously.185 
The report also discusses the role and mission of aerostats and how the aerostat is 
the most mature of the LTAs.  It is well documented in this report that the aerostats’ best 
attribute is its capability for “persistent surveillance,” coupled with a low life-cycle cost 
and long dwell time.186   
As discussed in the COASTS section of this chapter, aerostats are vulnerable to 
weather and enemy ground fire.  The CRS report illustrates this point by saying that 
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aerostats have been lost to severe weather, as have manned aircraft and UAVs.187  But, 
aerostats tend not to fail in benign weather, whereas aircraft and UAVs, which are more 
complex and dynamic systems, suffer accidents caused by factors such as human error 
and mechanical failure.188   
Lastly, during field experimentation in Thailand under the COASTS project, the 
balloon (aerostat) served as the most important communications node for the network 
(WLAN) topology.  Employing a stationary, LTA vehicle equipped with a wireless 
access point extended the effective wireless network range and user connectivity.  This 
node was invaluable and it enabled free-flow of information to and from the on-scene 
commander who was located several kilometers away.   
Peacekeeping, law enforcement, and first-responder personnel are frequently 
called upon to enter physical environments that adversely affect, or limit, the capabilities 
of current communication tools.  Combining an all-weather balloon, equipped with Wi-Fi 
technology, and multiple ground Wi-Fi units, offers almost instant situational awareness 
and communications over any land or water mass.   This connectivity can reduce 
response times and tactical decisions and thereby create advantages for the on-scene 
commander.189 
3. Unattended Air and Ground Sensors  
Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) is one document shaping U.S. military warfighting 
capability well into the 21st century.  When outlining Precision Engagement, JV2020 
states, “Precision engagement is effects-based engagement that is relevant to all types of 
operations. Its success depends on in-depth analysis to identify and to locate critical 
nodes and targets. The pivotal characteristic of precision engagement is the linking of 
sensors, delivery systems, and effects.”190  
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As with many technologies, sensor technology has evolved from military research 
and development.  It was during the Cold War that sensors proved their operational 
worthiness.  One of the first sensor systems designed for military applications was the 
Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS).191  It was a system of acoustic sensors 
(hydrophones) on the ocean bottom deployed at strategic locations to detect and track 
quiet Soviet submarines. 
 
Figure 13. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)192 
 
Modern research on sensor networks started around 1980 with DARPA’s 
Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN).193  Because microprocessor technology was still 
relatively immature in the early 1980s, the physical size of a sensor was a problem.  
However, this did not stop the military from foreseeing their application once their size 
could be reduced.  In fact, military planners quickly realized that sensor technology was 
fast becoming a crucial component of network-centric warfare.194  As the size and cost of 
embedded electronics systems reduced and their capabilities increased, new avenues 
opened for their application in areas such as defense, security, and law enforcement.195 
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That modern ISRT systems employ sophisticated sensors is imperative.  Sensor 
technology provides a wealth of data and can be deployed in a myriad of locations.  They 
can be placed on the ground for unattended ground sensing, in the air, underwater, on 
bodies, in vehicles, and inside buildings.  Establishing a system of networked sensors can 
detect and track threats (e.g., winged and wheeled vehicles, personnel, chemical and 
biological agents) and can be used for weapons targeting and area denial.196  Small and 
inexpensive sensors based on wireless networking and inexpensive low-power processors 
also allow for the deployment of wireless ad hoc197 networks, which can be used for 
various applications.  The following table outlines the history of modern sensor 
technology:  
 
Table 2. Three Generations of Sensor Nodes From198 
 Yesterday (1980’s 
to 1990’s) 
Today (2000-2001) Tomorrow (2010) 
Manufacturer  Custom contractors, 





Ember Corp.  
Dust, Inc. and others 
to be formed 
Size Large shoe box and 
up 
Pack of cards to 
small shoe box 
Dust particles 
Weight Kilograms Grams Negligible 















hours, days and 
longer 
AA batteries; days 
to weeks 
Solar; months to 
years 
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Unattended, wireless air, ground, and maritime sensors hold the future for the 
modern battlefield.  This integrated sensor network will be able to detect enemy 
movements, identify and locate targets, and feed that information back to the command 
center in real-time.199  One critical link is the positioning of these unattended sensors.  To 
fully exploit their capabilities, sensors must be tied into the network’s maneuver layer, 
which is made of mobile vehicles, either ground- or air-based assets.200  Which again, 
demonstrates the importance of UAVs and aerostats to C2 and the WLAN network.   
 
Figure 14. Deploying an Unattended Ground Sensor201 
 
Networking a series of sensors allows them to share information on the grid.  
“Correlated Sensors,” as Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory calls them, can help 
detect a nuclear terrorist attack, assist military operations in taking out a target, even to 
protect the president.202  In the tactical environment, networked sensors provide the 
capability for soldiers or patrolmen to dismount, yet still be kept abreast of mission 
developments.203  They can guide the soldier to the target area for recon or target 
acquisition.  One challenge to deploying the sensor grid is properly positioning them,  
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especially in rugged terrain or hostile environments.  A potential solution is to use UAVs 
to drop the sensors in predetermined locations and then have the UAV serve as an 
airborne router.204 
DARPA is developing a project, Quint Networking Technology (QNT), which 
allows for time-critical targeting information to be linked with weapon systems, tactical 
UAVs, and dismounted soldiers.  QNT provides for the dismounted ground force to 
receive the air and ground situational awareness picture while also allowing deployed 
ground forces to communicate, machine-to-machine, with air vehicles.205  
4. Wireless-LAN, Meshed Technologies (Wifi-802.11, 802.16) 
As previously suggested, perhaps the most critical linkage of deploying and 
operating a tactical “network” is having the capability of doing it wirelessly while still 
integrating all of the aforementioned technologies for employment on the battlefield or, 
for the purpose of this thesis, along the Thai-Malay border.  Therefore the backbone of 
this type of network should be based on wireless LAN (referred to as either WLAN or as 
WiFi) technology.   
Wireless Configurations 
Wireless systems have various configurations, point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, 
or multipoint-to-multipoint.  Point-to-point configuration is obviously not efficient for 
multicasting or where information must be shared, therefore, “networking” is not taking 
place.   
 
Figure 15. Point to Point Network206 
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Point-to-multipoint wireless networks are limited because there is no interaction 
among the clients in the network.  Information exchange only takes place between the 
sender and receiver, however, not among the network.   
 
Figure 16. Point to Multi-Point Network207 
 
Therefore, a preferred configuration for military applications is the multipoint-to-
multipoint topology.  In this configuration, every node becomes a router within the 
network, which enables a much wider coverage and this configuration allows for the 
formation of ad hoc networks.   
 
Figure 17. Multi-Point to Multi-Point Network208 
 
Ad hoc, wireless mesh networks, are self-organizing, self-healing, self-balancing 
and, most importantly, self-aware.  The basic idea behind self-organization is the network 
forms or bonds when separate networks come into contact with other.  Conceptualizing it 
as an analogy may make this term more understandable.  For example, if two clouds were                                                  
207 BelAir Networks White Paper, “Beyond the Hotspot: Wireless for Profit.”   
208 Ibid.   
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to combine, they have the capability to form one larger cloud.  This same concept applies 
to network technology.  As one wireless network, or “cloud,” encounters another, they 
can mesh and thus an ad hoc network is borne.   
 
 
Figure 18. WiFi Mesh Networks209 
 
Each network, or “cloud,” is aware of its surroundings and can collectively decide 
the optimum path to best send data across the network to maximize throughput.  If for 
some reason a path or route is weakened or lost, a better path will be selected, a process 
called “self-forming.”  As the number of clouds or nodes within a cloud increases, so 
does network strength.  An example of this is in Figures 16 and 17.  As nodes are added 
into the network, they will self-organize and self-heal.  If a particular node is weakened, 
the network will compensate by using another node within the network, and thus 
information will continue to be shared throughout the network.   
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Figure 19. Ad Hoc Networking210 
 
Once the network is formed, the capability exists to display this information 
world-wide in real-time under the USG’s Global Information Grid (GIG).211  For 
example, if a fire-fight occurs at a border somewhere in the world, and, if local forces are 
connected to a system within the GIG, the information available to the on-scene 
commander can be simultaneously broadcast to higher echelon decision-makers, such as 
those at the Pentagon.  
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
As with sensors, mobility is critical to today’s battlefield environment.  Therefore, 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are being designed to fill this gap.  Generally, there 
are three forms of meshed, ad hoc network protocols.  “Protocols” determine how data is 
sent or routed between the various network nodes.  The first protocol to be discussed is 
termed proactive, where each node attempts to maintain routes to all reachable 
destinations at all times, regardless of that individual node’s requirement to send data to 
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those other destinations.212  Next is reactive protocol, also known as on-demand, which 
differs sharply from the proactive approach because it actively seeks routes only when 
there are data to be sent and the routes are not known.213  Lastly, there are the hybrid and 
combination protocols.214  As the name suggests, a protocol was designed where a 
combination of proactive and reactive structures was formed.  This protocol is very 
flexible and easily adaptable, given the diverse range of employment scenarios and the 
mixture of equipment that will be included in the network. 
802.11 and 802.16 Technology 
WiFi, or wireless fidelity, is the popular name for the wireless Ethernet 802.11b 
standard for WLANs.215  Wireline local area networks emerged in the early 1980s as a 
way of allowing collections of PCs, terminals, and other computing devices to share 
resources and peripherals such as printers, access servers, or shared storage devices.  The 
next evolution was wireless LAN (WLAN), which uses the 802.11x family of Ethernet 
standards for WLAN, operating in the 2.4GHz unlicensed frequency spectrum and having 
a range of approximately 100m.216 
To overcome the 802.11b limitations of range (Line-of-Sight (LOS)) and 
bandwidth (11Mbs), another technology exists based on the 802.16 standard.  This 
standard provides for large data transfers over a much longer distance.  Specifically, the 
802.16 standard was designed for local and metropolitan area network (MAN) fixed 
broadband wireless access.217  The standard applies to frequencies between 10 and 66 
GHz and is capable of performance comparable to cable, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
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Engineering Task Force, (February 2004), 4.  
213 Wi-Fi Technology Forum - WLAN Wireless and Mobile Technology News, Web Page.  
214 Ibid.  
215 William Lehr and Lee W. McKnight, “Wireless Internet Access: 3G vs. WiFi?” 
Telecommunications Policy, http://pitpat.cs.utwente.nl/~draaijer/wifi/3G%20vs%20WiFi.pdf (accessed on 
3 September 2005), 355.   
216 David G. Leeper, “A Long-Term View of Short-Range Wireless,” Computer, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/2/20074/00928620.pdf (accessed 3 September 2005), 40.   
217 Intel Corporation, White Paper, “IEEE 802.16 *WirelessMAN* Specification Accelerates 
Wireless Broadband Access,” http://www.intel.com/technology/magazine/standards/st08031.pdf (accessed 
5 September 2005).   
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or T1 systems, with data transfer rates of 120Mbps for line-of-site (LOS) transmission in 
the 10-66 GHz frequency range and 70Mbps non-LOS transmission in the 2-11 GHz 
frequency range.218  It is also compatible with the 802.11 standard.  Additionally, 802.16 
systems are capable of providing: 
• Long range operation: radius up to 30 miles (extremely important for backhaul 
capability for deployed forces) 
• Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) performance 
• Ability to operate in high multi-path environment 
• Guaranteed service levels 
• Superior scalability 
• Quality of service capable of supporting voice and video applications 
• High Spectral efficiency 
• Routable networks within an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) 802 framework 
• Ability to support multicast traffic.219 
The primary advantages of 802.16 systems over other wired systems include cost 
savings, a quick setup, and a more complete coverage of the geographical area of interest.  
These advantages were witnessed first-hand during the two COASTS deployments in 
2005.  Two 802.16 links, of six and nine kilometers respectively, were rapidly established 
(full operational capability achieved in under two hours) and due to the large bandwidth 
available, vast amounts of video (and other sensor data) and network information was 
delivered over the network with a high degree of speed and accuracy.  The combined cost 
of the equipment (provided by Redline Communications) required to operate these two 
links was approximately $30,000 USD.  This cost compares quite favorable when 
compared to the costs of laying fiber-optic cable (approximately $20,000 USD per mile 
in Thailand).   
 
                                                 
218 Intel Corporations, White Paper, “Understanding Wi-Fi and WiMAX as Metro-Access Solutions,” 
http://www.intel.com/netcomms/technologies/wimax/304471.pdf (accessed 5 September 2005).     
219 Intel Corporations, White Paper, “Understanding Wi-Fi and WiMAX as Metro-Access Solutions.”      
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5. Other Technologies (Tacticomps, Language Translation Devices) 
This thesis has briefly mentioned the role of the dismounted soldier.  Therefore, it 
is prudent to discuss briefly some of the technologies currently being developed to assist 
them in accomplishing their mission.  Two technologies will be discussed further, 
specifically, wearable computing devices and language translation devices. 
a. Tacticomps  
Wearable or hand-held computing devices,220 sometimes referred to as 
tacticomps, are devices that can provide situational awareness and C2 capabilities to 
commanders from the platoon through battalion levels.  One example of this technology 
is Raytheon Corporation’s Data Automated Communications Terminal (DACT) system.   
DACT, one of many decision-making tools available to the modern 
warfighter, provides the capability to send and receive digital messages, either in free or 
formatted texts, to view maps and overlays or freeform annotations on to maps, to 
perform route planning by plotting way-points on map overlays, to navigate with 
precision GPS; and is also updateable with situational awareness suites that display 
“blue” and “red” force tracking.221   
 
Figure 20. Raytheon’s DACT System222 
                                                 
220 These devices are designed using rugged personal digital assistant (PDAs) loaded with C2 
software.   
221 Raytheon Home Page, “DACT” http://www.raytheon.com/products/dact/  (accessed 4 September 
2005).  
222 Ibid.   
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b. Language Translation Devices 
Another technology that is essential for the dismounted soldier is language 
translation devices.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff Advanced Concept and Technology 
Development office recently established the Language and Speech Exploitation 
Resources (LASER) program which states:  
Operational units typically deploy with insufficient numbers of qualified 
foreign language specialists and limited reachback support. Joint forces 
are increasingly becoming coalition forces.  Multiple language 
requirements exist across all disciplines in the full range of military 
operations: medical assistance, noncombatant evacuation operation, force 
protection, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, hostile action, and 
intelligence gathering and exploitation. Department of Defense (DoD) 
forces deploy to worldwide geographic locations with widely diverse 
languages and must operate with multinational forces and coordinate 
military operations with government agencies and international 
organizations.  Often, these deployments occur with inadequate means to 
communicate in the languages of the multinational forces and 
organizations.224 
                                                 
223 Raytheon Home Page, “DACT” http://www.raytheon.com/products/dact/  (accessed 4 September 
2005).  
224 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER), Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration Community Assistance Response Exercise 2004 Limited Military Utility Assessment 
Report, (July 2004), 3.   
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Under development are three interesting language translation devices 
which are as follows: the Multilingual Automatic Speech-to-Speech Translator 
(MASTOR), the Bilingual Phraselator, and the Voice Response Translator (VRT).   
(1) MASTOR:  International Business Machines (IBM) 
Corporation developed MASTOR to facilitate communication via translation of natural 
spoken language.  The system currently runs on Windows Experience or Windows 2000 
laptop computers.  MASTOR can translate in limited domains, including medical 
assistance, travel reservation, telephone banking, and force protection.  Both the English 
speaker and the target language speaker must wear headsets containing earphones and 
microphones in order to communicate via the MASTOR (see Figure 20).225 
  
 
Figure 22. MASTOR  
 
 
The MASTOR relies on “speech-to-text” conversions, whereby 
spoken phrases are converted into text. The text is translated and then converted back into 
speech. The system also uses a pictorial display to illustrate the main concept embedded 
in the speech (see Figure 21). MASTOR produces contextual rather than literal 
translations (i.e., utterances that use different words but have the same meaning are 
translated the same way). For example, “I am injured” and “I need a doctor” would both 
be translated into an identical spoken sentence that would convey the need for medical 
assistance.   
                                                 
225 Language and Speech Exploitation Resources (LASER), Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration Community Assistance Response Exercise 2004 Limited Military Utility Assessment 
Report, (July 2004), 3. 
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Figure 23. Example of MASTOR Text 
 
 
(2) PHRASELATOR:  The Bilingual Phraselator is a software 
system that operates on PDAs and Windows-based PCs.  It is designed for situations in 
which the information to be translated is fairly routine, predictable, and constrained.  The 
system is designed chiefly for situations in which the English speaker controls the 
dialogue and the target language speaker provides one in a set of standard, expected 
responses.  The device has approximately 600 questions and statements useful for 
medical and refugee camp interviews, as well as general questions and phrases, in its 
database. The phrases are grouped into mission domains and loaded via external modules. 
The Bilingual Phraselator also has the capability to identify words requiring urgent 
attention such as “doctor,” “ambulance,” “help,” “bomb,” “pain,” and “danger.” To use 
the Bilingual Phraselator, the English speaker must either state one of the predefined 
phrases or locate it on the display and select it with the stylus or navigation button. (If the 
phrase was spoken, the voice recognition software can display it in text format on screen 
for verification.) The target language speaker’s response must match one of the pre-
recorded Pashto phrases, or it will not be translated.226 
 
                                                 
226 LASER Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Community Assistance Response Exercise 
2004 Limited Military Utility Assessment Report.   
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Figure 24. Phraselator 
 
 
(3) Voice Response Translator (VRT):  The VRT is an 
automated language translation device that translates human language from a source 
language (the user’s language) to a target language.  Earlier generations of the VRT were 
initially fielded in 1997 in civilian police forces as a means of conducting routine traffic 
stops and crowd control.  Later generations have been deployed in DOD since 2000.  The 
VRT is a speech-to-speech, one-way translation, phrase-based tool. It is not a notional 
“universal translator” – meaning it is not a real time, two-way, free-flowing translator.  
The potential scope of use for the VRT is dictated by its capabilities.  Since the VRT is a 
speech-to-speech, one-way, human language translation device that uses strictly pre-
recorded phrases, it lends itself best to straightforward and repetitive situations where any 
expected replies can be visually expressed by body gestures or compliant behavior.  
Three environments where research has been conducted are coalition compound 
checkpoints, house searches, and maritime warning operation.227 
                                                 
227 LASER, Concept of Operations for Conduct of the Voice Response Translator (VRT), 4.   
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Figure 25. Voice Response Translator (VRT) System in Use 
 
 
B. COALITION OPERATING AREA SURVEILLANCE AND TARGETING 
SYSTEM (COASTS) 
COASTS is an individual and small unit network-capable communication and 
threat warning system that uses open, plug-and-play architecture, is user-configurable, 
employs LTA (balloons), UAVs, and portable and fixed air-, ground-, and maritime-
based sensors, i.e. soldiers equipped with Tacticomp or similar PDAs, all of which 
communicate via wireless network technology.228   
For years, NPS has been involved with research pertaining to low-cost, state-of-
the-art, rapidly scaleable, real-time threat warning and tactical communications 
equipment.  Existing NPS projects, such as the Tactical Network Topology (TNT) 
(formerly called Surveillance and Targeting Acquisition Network or STAN) involves 
hardware, software, and tools/tactics/procedures (TTP’s) that are classified or 
operationally sensitive and thus not available to coalition partners.  Therefore the 
COASTS program was specifically developed to address this shortfall.  Simultaneously, 
the COASTS program complies with very important strategic missions:  
 
                                                 
228 COASTS Concept of Operations Document, 6 (See Appendix B).   
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• DOD’s requirement to operate in coalition environments and 
strengthen relationships with foreign military partners; 
• U.S. Pacific Command’s commitment to foster stronger multi-
lateral relations in technology development and coalition warfare 
with key Pacific area of responsibility allies in WoT229  
The purpose of COASTS is to leverage and integrate the technological expertise 
of the program’s education and research partners with the operational requirements and 
challenges of using WLAN technologies in a tactical, coalition environment.  It serves as 
a mobile field test-bed environment for R&D, integration, operational testing, and field 
validation of several emerging wireless technologies and equipment suites (such as 
802.11 and 802.16) in a tactical coalition environment.  
COASTS creates an international interaction mechanism for U.S. military forces, 
including NPS, to collaborate with coalition partners and allies to support WoT 
objectives and requirements using the latest wireless networking technologies, tools, 
tactics and techniques.  In fact, NPS and Thailand have begun to integrate COASTS into 
a system to facilitate surveillance and monitoring the RTG deems as “areas of interest,” 
especially along their 2,500km porous border with Burma.   
The RTAF approached NPS requesting assistance integrating WLAN’s and 
related surveillance and targeting technologies to augment their border patrolling 
resources.  The RTAF, understanding the capability of UAV’s, meshed sensor networks, 
and being aware of NPS’s STAN field experiment program, endorsed COASTS as a 
suitable technology collaboration vehicle for investigating real-world information 
gathering and dissemination for issues such as narco-terrorism and human slave 
trafficking along the Thai-Burmese border.230   
In 2005, NPS students and faculty deployed the COASTS project to Thailand 
twice.  A network set-up and rehearsal (see Figure 26) was conducted in March 2005 and 
a field research exercise and demonstration was conducted in May 2005.   
                                                 
229 COASTS Concept of Operations Document, 6 (See Appendix B), 5.   
230 Ibid., 11. 
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Figure 26 displays the current COASTS’ notional architecture, employing each of 
the emerging technologies discussed, ranging from UAVs to ground sensors.  Future 
iterations of COASTS will incorporate other technologies expanding COASTS’ 
operational capabilities to include satellite communication links, unmanned underwater 
vehicles, and automated situational awareness software to name but a few.   
 
Figure 26. COASTS Notional Architecture  
 
The Southern Border 
As detailed in Chapters II and III, over the past 30 months, the RTG has been 
involved in a bloody insurgency in the Muslim-majority southern, specifically at the 





separatist groups are fighting to establish an independent state.  Since January 2004, more 
than 800 people have died in a slew of shootings and bombings in the provinces of 
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.231  
COASTS, even though initially intended for employment along the Thai-Burmese 
border, should be considered by the RTAF and RTG for implementation along their 
southern border as well.  This project has the capability to provide the necessary 
intelligence to help secure their southern border.  In fact, the COASTS program addresses 
many of the RTARF’s requirements relating to border security by embracing and 
leveraging commercially available technology, increasing overall military effectiveness, 
highlighting the utility of a UAV as a reconnaissance platform, and providing an 
alternative, and low-cost solution, to indigenous R&D efforts.  In addition, all of these 
factors are accomplished while reducing manpower or the “personnel footprint,” a key 
point, especially when taking into consideration the history of the Thai-Malay border.   
                                                 
231 Rueters On-Line, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/BKK56496.htm (accessed 28 August 
2005).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
Research documents that the motivation to conduct or engage in armed conflict 
stems primarily from perceived differences in political and economic status and religious 
ideologies and beliefs.  These perceived concepts and the resultant armed resistance that 
forms has existed for decades, if not centuries.  Low-intensity conflict, insurgency 
operations, and asymmetrical warfare are all terms synonymous with the various 
struggles and resistance that have resurfaced after September 11th and the entry into the 
War on Terror; the conflict in southern Thailand is no exception.  The labels attached to 
these struggles are used to identify the many ways in which fundamentalist organizations 
around the world operate to include groups such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and 
the little known separatist groups in Thailand’s southern border region, i.e. the Pattani 
United Liberation Organization (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional – BRN, and Gerakan 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement) – GMIP just to name 
a few.   
This thesis has described in some detail the resurgence of ethno-religious violence 
that has resurfaced in southern Thailand after a two decade absence and one possible 
solution to reduce or mitigate the violence now ravaging southern Thailand: the 
employment of technologies such as those utilized in NPS’ COASTS field experiment 
program.   
In this analysis, the plight of the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand was 
outlined.  The research started with a fairly detailed history of southern Thailand, 
describing how Islam came to the region and the emergence of Patani Raya or the Greater 
Patani State.  Furthermore, it described how Patani Raya was considered, at one time in 
history, as one of the cradles of Islam in the region.  In addition, the historical conflict 
between the central Thai state and the ethnic Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand was 
also explored.  Highlights included the Muslim-Malay separatist ideology that developed 
in southern Thailand through “internal colonization,” the perceived differences of the 
Malay-Muslims by the central Thai government, and the results of incomplete nation 
building.  Evidence was provided to show that internal factors, such as the various Thai 
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government policies used against the Malay-Muslims, and external factors, such as the 
porous border region, dual-citizenship, and the Malaysian political party PAS, have 
combined to play a major role in shaping southern Thai separatist ideology.  
However, the main intent of this thesis was to bridge the information gap that 
exists between the theoretical sphere and the operational sphere of how to provide a 
potential answer to reducing the violence that is currently plaguing one of the U.S.’ 
closest allies in Southeast Asia.  This thesis has made an argument that one possible 
solution to reducing violence in southern Thailand is for the RTG to implement 
technologies such as those tested in the NPS COASTS field research program.  These 
technologies certainly have applicability along the Thai-Malay border.   
The COASTS program is beneficial to both the U.S. and to the RTG for various 
reasons.  It is beneficial to the RTG because it provides a possible solution to one of their 
national security problems, namely porous borders.  The RTG understands their “open” 
borders are a detriment to their internal security as well as to regional stability.  Whether 
in the context of illicit drug trafficking, the trafficking of people, or insurgency/militancy, 
the RTG recognizes that sealing their borders is a national priority.  The Thai government 
also realizes how counter-insurgency campaigns require the ability to perform various 
missions with high speed, small size, and reliable technology.  With this in mind, the 
RTG has asked the U.S. for assistance in developing a reliable, fairly inexpensive border 
security system to support their border security requirements..  NPS responded by 
developing the COASTS program focused on low-cost solutions for border defense 
through integration of commercial-off-the-shelf technologies.  Ultimately, the COASTS 
program provides the necessary shared situational awareness (SSA), command and 
control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) 
capability to bolster Thailand’s intelligence apparatus and to combat the asymmetrical 
threats which are occurring within southern Thailand.   
The COASTS program also meets the spirit and intent U.S. Pacific Command’s 
(USPACOM) science and technology research requirements, specifically relating to 
theater security and the War on Terror (WOT).  Additionally COASTS demonstrates 
USPACOM’s commitment to foster stronger multi-lateral relations in the area of 
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technology development and coalition warfare with key Pacific AOR allies in the WoT, 
which the Kingdom of Thailand is a major partner. 
During 2005, the COASTS program twice deployed teams to Lop Buri, Thailand.  
The first deployment was in March 2005; the objective for this deployment was to 
conduct a rehearsal of the various nodes and communications links in preparation for the 
deployment that would take place in May 2005.  During the May 2005 field experiment, 
the COASTS team successfully integrated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerial 
balloons (LTA vehicles), portable and fixed ground-based sensors, Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and non-GPS enabled tracking systems, as well as other technologies to 
provide shared situational awareness to local and strategic users.   This demonstration 
focused on integrating all of the sensor data at a Royal Thai Army command and control 
vehicle, called a Mobile Command Platform (MCP), and then linking it to higher 
headquarters, specifically the Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters (RTAF HQ) and the 
Royal Thai Supreme Command (RTSC), both located at different compounds in 
Bangkok, Thailand.  While the program was very successful for its first deployment there 
were several lessons learned and actions to correct the findings are currently underway.  
Planning for COASTS 2006 is currently underway with all lessons learned from 2005 
taken under advisement.    
It can be concluded that NPS’ COASTS field experiment provided insight to 
technologies which may help fulfill the RTG’s requirements for a low-cost, technology-
based border defense system to assist RTARF intelligence units and RTG command 
authority in support of counter-insurgency operations aimed at reducing the violence 
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1.0  Purpose. 
 
This document describes the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the 
development and implementation of a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
research project entitled Coalition Operating Area Surveillance & Targeting 
System (COASTS).  COASTS support U.S. Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) science and technology research requirements relating to 
theater security and the War On Terror (WOT).  This CONOPS is primarily 
intended for use by the Naval Postgraduate School and USPACOM 
management team and participating contractors and coalition partners.  
However, it may also be used by other Department Of Defense (DOD) 
organizations when applicable.  The research and development of COASTS 
is described in this document as well as the proposed timetable for a series 
of limited objective experiments (LOE’s). 
1.1 Background. 
 
The COASTS proposed coalition field experimentation concept is 
modeled after a very successful ongoing NPS-driven field 
experimentation program known as STAN.  NPS, in cooperation with 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and several 
contractors, has been engaged in a Research and Development (R&D) 
program entitled Surveillance and Target Acquisition Network (STAN) 
since FY2002.  The program was initiated in support of a USSOCOM 
requirement for integrating emerging WLAN technologies with 
surveillance and targeting hardware/software systems to augment 
Special Operations Forces missions.  STAN has grown significantly 
since inception to include 10-12 private sector companies demonstrating 
new hardware/software capabilities, several DoD organizations (led by 
NPS) introducing operational and tactical surveillance and targeting 
requirements, as well as other universities contributing solutions.  
1.1.1 STAN Specifics. 
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STAN field experiments occur quarterly as a 1-2 week long complex 
experiment comprising 8-10 NPS faculty members, 20-30 NPS 
students, and representatives from multiple private companies, DoD 
and U.S. government agencies. Major STAN objectives are as 
follows: 
- Provide an opportunity for NPS students and faculty to 
experiment/evaluate with the latest technologies which have 
potential near-term application to the warfighter. 
- Leverage operational experience of NPS students and 
faculty 
- Provide military, national laboratories, contractors, and 
civilian universities an opportunity to test and evaluate new 
technologies in operational environments 
- Utilize small, focused field experiments with well-defined 
measures of performance for both the technologies and the 
operator using the technologies 
- Implement self-forming / self-healing, multi-path, ad-hoc 
network w/sensor cell, ground, air, SATCOM network 
components 
 
Examples of STAN experiments:  
- 802.11b/g / OFDM / 802.16 architecture 
- Network performance to include wireless traffic monitoring 
- Network vulnerability and intrusion detection capabilities 
- ARIES AUV – TERN UAV/balloon– TOC video transfer 
- Target geo-location from UAV video using live image 
differencing  
- Tasks and functions for TUAV in support of recognized 
maritime picture 
- Red Team intent 
- INTER-4 Tacticomp (hand-held network enabled PDA)  
1.1.2 STAN Limitations. 
 
1.1.2.1 Sensitivities with Foreign Observers/Participants. 
Certain hardware, software, and tools/tactics/procedures (TTP’s) 
implemented at STAN field experiments are classified or operationally 
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sensitive and as a result STAN sponsors have not agreed to foreign 
military partnerships.  Despite DOD requirements to operate in coalition 
environments, to strengthen relationships with foreign military partners, 
and to execute operations globally, STAN field experiments remain 
primarily a U.S.-only event.   
 
1.1.2.2 Meteorological, Hydrographic, & Geographic 
Considerations. 
All STAN field experiments have been conducted at NPS’s 
facilities in the Monterey California area.  This vegetation 
and climate is not representative of the Pacific Area of 
Responsibility (AOR)—a likely deployment location for 
these tactical or operational WLAN and 
surveillance/targeting technologies.   Higher temperatures 
and humidity, as well as denser vegetation in areas like 
Thailand and Singapore, will likely create WLAN and sensor 
performance problems.   
 
1.1.3 COASTS. 
   
1.1.3.1 Purpose. 
COASTS will leverage and integrate the technological 
expertise of the program’s education and research partners 
with the operational requirements and challenges of using 
WLAN technologies in a tactical, coalition environment.  
Additionally COASTS will demonstrate USPACOM 
commitment to foster stronger multi-lateral relations in the 
area of technology development and coalition warfare with 
key Pacific AOR allies in the WOT. 
 
1.1.3.2 Strategy. 
COASTS will serve as a mobile field test bed environment 
for R&D, integration, operational testing, and field validation 
of several emerging wireless technologies and equipment 
suites (such as 802.11, 802.16, orthogonal frequency division 
multiplexing (OFDM), free space optics (FSO), satellite 







- Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13, 9 
October 1998 
- Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), Joint 
Pub 3-13, 7 February 1996 
- Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, Joint Pub 3-54, 24 January 
1997 
- Joint Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations, Joint Pub 6-0, 
30 May 1995 
 
1.3 Scope. 
This CONOPS applies to the employment of the COASTS project as 
part of the NPS R&D program.  It will also serve as the base 
document for the CONOPS addressing the employment of COASTS, 
in part or in whole, in support of exercise COBRA GOLD 2005 or 
other similar exercises, events, or demonstrations.  The CONOPS 
will provide a technical and tactical framework for operational 
scenarios used during FY05 and reflect the employment of the 
COASTS system as an integrated component to support emerging 
Regional Combatant Commander and DOD requirements for 
coalition operations.  This CONOPS will cover the use of COASTS 
as a stand-alone or networked capability focused on Joint/coalition 





2.1 Current Situation.   
As reflected by the increasing number of requests to NPS from 
foreign partners, there is an operational requirement for low-cost, 
state-of-the-art, real-time threat warning and tactical communication 
equipment that is rapidly scaleable based on operational 
considerations.  Unlike STAN most current tactical systems lack the 
capability to rapidly enable a common operating picture amongst air, 
surface, and sub-surface entities via a self-forming, self-
authenticating, autonomous network.  Although commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) technologies exist that can satisfy some of these 
requirements, they typically do not meet all of the DOD and 
coalition partner requirements associated with WOT and other 
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security missions.   The objective of COASTS is to demonstrate that 
NPS and coalition R&D, in concert with COTS capabilities currently 
available, can satisfy all of the technical and tactical requirements. 
2.2 System Summary.    
COASTS is an individual and small unit network-capable 
communication and threat warning system using an open, plug-and-
play architecture, which is user-configurable, employing air 
balloons, UAVs, and portable and fixed ground-based sensors, i.e. 
soldiers equipped with Tacticomp or similar PDAs, all 
communicating via wireless network technology. 
2.3 Capabilities.    
COASTS provides a mobile field test bed environment for U.S. and 
coalition partners in support of R&D, integration, operational testing, 
and field validation of several emerging wireless technologies and 
equipment suites as follows: 
- 802.11 a/b/g 
- 802.16 
- Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) 
- Free Space Optics (FSO) 
- Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 
  
2.4 Major Components.    
While the final configuration of the COASTS system has not yet been 
determined, the following describes the core components of the basic 
ensemble:  
 
- Networked Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) 
- Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV’s) 
- Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UMV’s) 
- Tethered wireless network connected balloons 
- Manned and unmanned sensors of many types 
- Surveillance and targeting systems 







INTER-4 Tacticomp Handheld GPS Enabled Networked Situational 
Awareness Tools 
2.5 Configurations.   
COASTS will have three basic configurations: as a command, control, 
collection, and communication suite; a threat warning system; an 
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                   Foreground – Network Monitoring Suite  
Background – GPS Enabled Situational Awareness Suite 
 




COASTS will create an international interaction mechanism for U.S. 
military forces, to include NPS, to collaborate with coalition partners 
and allies to support War on Terror (WOT) objectives and 
requirements using the latest wireless networking technologies, 
tools, tactics and techniques.  NPS, Thailand and Singapore are the 
proposed initial team that will integrate COASTS into a system to 





3.2 COASTS Support for Principal Mission Areas. 
 
As per Joint Doctrine, COASTS will directly support organizing 
training, and equipping U.S. military forces and the 
Thailand/Singapore Defense Forces in seven principal mission areas: 
 
(1) Direct Action (DA):  The primary function of COASTS during 
DA missions is to provide Force Protection. DA missions are 
typically short-duration, offensive, high-tempo operations that 
require real-time threat information presented with little or no 
operator interface.  COASTS will augment other capabilities in 
direct support of the DA from an overwatch position.  COASTS in 
support of the DA will target collection to support threat warnings 
relevant to that specific operation and provide automated reporting to 
the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for potential threats relevant to 
a specific mission.  COASTS may also be used as the primary source 
of threat information in the absence of other capabilities.  Threat 
information presented by COASTS is intended to be relevant, real-
time or near real-time, and within its area of operation. 
 
(2) Tactical Reconnaissance (TR): The primary purpose of a TR 
mission is to collect information.  COASTS will augment other 
capabilities to obtain or verify information concerning the 
capabilities, intentions, locations, and activities of an actual or 
potential enemy.  COASTS will support the full range of information 
and communication functions.  COASTS will support operators to 
collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information rapidly.  
COASTS performance in this mission will be affected by 
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic considerations; in these 
scenarios, COASTS will primarily support Force Protection. 
 
(3) Foreign Internal Defense (FID):  COASTS will assist Host 
Nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces with the goal to enable 
these forces to maintain the HN’s internal stability. 
 
(4) Combating Terrorism (CT):  COASTS will support CBT 
activities to include anti-terrorism (defensive measures taken to 
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive 
measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to 
oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.   
 
(5) Civil Affairs (CA):  COASTS will assist CA activities in 
peacetime to preclude grievances from flaring into war and during  
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hostilities to help ensure that civilians do not interfere with 
operations and that they are protected and cared for if in a combat 
zone. 
 
(6) Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):  
COASTS will assist traditional capabilities to seize, destroy, render 
safe, capture, or recover WMD.  COASTS can provide information 
to assist U.S. Military Forces and coalition partners to operate 
against threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. 
 
(7) Information Operations (IO):  COASTS can augment actions 
taken to affect adversary information and information systems while 
defending one’s own information and information systems.  IO 












3.2.1 Thailand Requirements. 
 
3.2.1.1 Thailand Requirement Overview.   
 
Thailand has a 2500 kilometer border with Myanmar 
that requires its military assets to patrol, as well as to 
provide surveillance, monitoring and targeting to 
combat drugs from entering the country via 
Myanmar.  This narco-terrorism problem is 
significant for both Thailand and the U.S. as much of 
the illicit drug trafficking supports the finances and 
operations of terrorist organizations.  In addition, 
some of the drugs that do slip through Thailand’s 
security infrastructure end up on the streets in the 
U.S. via container shipping in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore Straits.  The Royal Thai Air Force 
(RTAF) has been assigned the responsibility of 
patrolling the Thailand/Myanmar border areas by the 
Thailand Ministry of Defense (MOD). 
 
3.2.1.2 COASTS Support to Thai Requirements.   
 
The RTAF has recently approached NPS for 
assistance using WLAN’s and related 
surveillance/targeting technologies to augment their 
border patrolling resources.  The RTAF has been 
considering using UAV’s and sensor meshes to patrol 
this long border, and is aware of NPS’s STAN field 
experiment program.  COASTS appears to be suitable 
as a technology collaboration vehicle,  but also as a 
demonstration and field test environment with 
Thailand to develop the capability for real-world 
information gathering and dissemination on their 
narco-terrorism and human slave trafficking 
problems. 
 
3.2.2 Singapore Requirements. 
 
3.2.2.1 Singapore Requirement Overview.   
 
Singapore, as a small island city/state surrounded by 
water, has grave concerns about the alarming increase 
in the frequency of piracy near the country.  
Singapore is also in very close proximity to two key 
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international shipping waterways, the Singapore 
Straits and the Straits of Malacca that are attractive 
targets for terrorists to exploit the container shipping 
industry in those waterways.   About 80 percent of the 
world’s container shipping vessels pass through these 
two key Southeast Asian waterways.  Singapore is 
currently able to identify and track a small portion of 
these container ships in their littoral waterways with 
current resources and technologies.  
 
3.2.2.2 COASTS Support to Singapore 
Requirements.   
 
Singapore has also recently contacted NPS about 
collaboration using WLAN and related 
surveillance/targeting technologies to patrol the 
Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Straits.  The 
National University of Singapore (NUS) and a 
research/development lab on the NUS campus – the 
Temasek Labs have had a long-standing relationship 
with NPS.  NUS/Temasek Labs have had a masters 
degree program for several years, with NPS faculty 
deploying to Singapore to teach part of a technical 
curriculum at the University.  NPS also has had 
significant interaction with Singapore’s Defense 
Science & Technology Agency (DSTA).  DSTA has 
expressed interest in collaborative WLAN and 
surveillance/targeting research with NPS.  We 
envision both Temasek Labs and DSTA as key 
coalition partners for the COASTS initiative.  
Temasek Labs and DSTA have been conducting 
research in the WLAN space for some time, and there 
are some technologies they are investigating that 
could be of great value to NPS and DOD. 
 
3.3 LOE Implementation and Objectives. 
 
3.3.1 Phased Approach.   
 
A phased spiral development will be implemented 
culminating with two or three major demonstrations.  Phase I 
– will consist of a technology search of existing off-the-shelf 
capabilities and a limited integration that can be quickly 
tailored / packaged to enhance the missions described in 
paragraph 3.3 above.  Demonstration One would focus on the 
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near term problem of setting up one COASTS node and 
displaying a real-time, or near real-time, automated 
communication link between an aerial balloon and a ground 
sensor in support of exercise COBRA GOLD 2005.  Phase I 
ends with the first demonstration in the 3rd Quarter of FY05.  
Phase II – will integrate and demonstrate additional 
capabilities into a more robust system.  Operators will pick 
the capabilities after the conclusion of Phase I.  Phase II will 
conclude with a second demonstration in the 4th Quarter of 
FY05 in the Singapore Straits of Malacca region. 
 
3.3.2 Phase I - NPS.   
 
NPS would invite foreign COASTS participants to NPS for 
the next Field Experiment (November 2004) as observers.  
NPS will desensitize the November 2004 Field Experiment 
such that COASTS foreign partners will be able to observe 
the overall experiment.  This will enable the foreign partners 
to see first hand a WLAN-enabled surveillance and targeting 
operation.  It is also possible to add new experiments to the 
NPS November 04 Field Experiment on the coast near Point 
Sur to test an 802.16 point-to-point network’s performance 
over water (a study of WLAN performance in the littorals).  
This would correlate well with demonstrations outlined 
below in Thailand and Singapore (specific CONOPS are in 
development). 
 
3.3.3 Phase II – Thailand.   
 
Introduce a COASTS demonstration into Exercise Cobra 
Gold in April 2005 to prove a permanently deployed tactical 
WLAN’s ability to monitor a border region (such as the 
Thailand/Myanmar border region).  To keep the scope 
manageable NPS proposes implementing only a limited 
number of STAN-like technologies and experiments with 
very specific goals and objectives such as possibly using only 
a balloon (vice a UAV) to create an 802.11 (2.4 GhZ) local 
area tactical network footprint, having one 802.16 or OFDM 
(5.8 GhZ) backbone long haul link, setting up and operating a 
simple tactical operations center (TOC) that collects and 
displays data feeds, introducing a few unmanned sensors 
(such as seismic monitors, sound sensors, and streaming 
ground or balloon originating video feeds), deploying a few 
personnel using wearable networked computing devices, or 
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INTER-4 Tacticomps, and integrate an existing GPS enabled 
Situational Awareness system.   
 
 
3.3.3.1 Specifics:   
 
An additional set of relatively simple tests, modeled 
after an experiment proposed for the November 04 
Field Experiment, will be conducted as “littorals 
operations” setting up a point-to-point 802.16 access 
point enabled WLAN on the coast in Thailand with a 
ship positioned to access the network.  A Test Plan 
would be developed with the ship moving further and 
further away from the access point while collecting 
network performance data (throughput measuring 
performance with different types of data such as 
voice, video, data – all at varying distances).  This 
experiment could also focus on meteorological 
information as it effects network performance 
(throughput and sensor performance), as the much 
higher levels of moisture in the Gulf of Thailand will 
significantly impact performance of networks and 
sensors. 
 
This notional integration with exercise Cobra Gold 
2005 will allow partners an opportunity to test various 
technologies in different environments without the 
complexity and risk of flying UAV’s.   
 
3.3.4 Phase III - Singapore.   
 
Tentatively conduct another demonstration in Singapore later 
in CY 2005 to demonstrate a permanently deployed tactical 
WLAN’s utility for monitoring a key waterway (such as the 
Straits of Malacca), but add technologies that may include 
some of the following: sensors, UAVs, UUVs, surface 
vessels, SATCOM components, and experimentation over 
land and water.  Singapore has also expressed interest in 
testing a manned ground vehicle in a WLAN environment 







3.3.5 COASTS Critical Event Schedule.   
 
Table 1 below depicts a high level of schedule of critical 
events projected for the COASTS project.  Included are the 
critical development and demonstration milestones. 
 
 
Task Projected Date 
  
Thailand RTAF 




Labs Planning Visit (at 
NPS) 
NOV 04 
Field Experiment (at 
NPS) 
NOV 04 
Cobra Gold 05 CDC (at 
USPACOM) 
NOV 04 
Cobra Gold 05 
Planning Meeting I and 
II (in Thailand) 
OCT 04 and JAN 
05 respectively 
Cobra Gold 05 Demo 
(in Thailand) 
APR 05 
Singapore Demo (in 
Singapore) 
JUN 05 





Field Experiments (at 
NPS) 
NOV 05 
Cobra Gold 06 
Planning Meeting  
TBD: OCT 05 – 
MAR 06 
Cobra Gold 06 Demo 
(in Thailand) 
TBD: APR 06 
 
Table 1: Critical Events 
 
3.4 Critical Operational Issues (COIS), Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). 
 
The COASTS project has three primary overarching COIs: 
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- Does COASTS provide threat warning information as part of a 
wireless LAN/WAN? 
- Does COASTS meet performance requirements when deployed to 
Thailand (ground/jungle scenario)? 
- Does COASTS meet performance requirements when deployed to 
Singapore (water scenario)? 
The COASTS Oversight Group (see 4.1 below) will refine and 
finalize the supporting MOEs and MOPs, linked to specific 
operational tasks, standards and conditions, based on the evolving 
CONOPS for each specific demonstration.  The assessment strategy 
and the final assessment criteria will be clearly delineated in the 
demonstration CONOPS. 
 
4.0 Management Strategy. 
 
4.1 Participating Organizations, Roles, and Responsibilities. 
 
4.1.1 COASTS Oversight Group. 
 
- Chair: NPS Dean of Research 
- Members: NPS Principal Investigator, NPS Operational 
Manager, and NPS Technical Manager 
 
4.1.2 NPS Principal Investigator (PI).   
 
Lead element of the COASTS project; responsible for project 
oversight, coordination between NPS, DOD, foreign partners, 
and commercial vendors; responsible for all fiduciary reports 
and contractual agreements. 
 
- Co-PI: Mr. Brian Steckler and Mr. James Ehlert 
 
4.1.3 NPS Operational Manager (OM).   
 
The OM is responsible for developing all demonstrations, 
plans, collection and dissemination of data, site surveys, 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures of Performance 
(MOP), NPS resource allocation, internal NPS coordination, 
and support to the PI. 
 
The OM plans, coordinates and directs all user activities 
related to the COASTS project.  The OM will develop and 
provide the CONOPS, TTPs, operational mission scenarios, 
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and the overall utility assessment.  Additionally, the OM will 
coordinate administrative tasks for user participants, 
equipment and facilities supporting demonstration events. 
 
- OM:  Captain Gary Thomason, USMC 
 
4.1.4 NPS Technical Manager (TM).    
 
The TM is responsible for technical management including 
program management, engineering, and acquisition of 
technologies to integrate and demonstrate.  The TM will 
provide technical support to the OM and manage all funding 
and technology development efforts related to the COASTS 
project.  The TM has the overall responsibility for 
establishing criteria for technical performance evaluations. 
 
- TM: Assignment TBD 
 
4.1.5 Participating Test Organizations.    
 
The primary organization for assessment for the COASTS 
project is the Naval Postgraduate School.  Other participating 
organizations are as follows: 
   
- U.S. National Tactical Integration Office (NTIO) 
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
- U.S. Joint Information Operations Command (JIOC) 
- Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 
- National University of Singapore (NUS) 
- NUS’s Temasek Labs 
- Singapore’s Defense Science & Technology Agency 
(DSTA) 
   
4.2 Risk Assessment, Management and Mitigation. 
 
Overall risk is estimated to be low to medium for the COASTS 
initiative.  Risks can be mitigated by either reducing or adding 
additional experiments as appropriate.  Table 2 depicts the NPS 








Risk Area Rating Mitigation Approaches 
Technology Low 
Medium 
- leverage STAN technology 
- early/continuous coordination 
with partners  
- early prototyping 
- multiple data collection events
- modeling and simulation 
- in-process reviews 




- schedule estimates based on 
technology provider agreements
- schedule estimates incorporate 
STAN lessons learned 
Schedule - Demos Low 
Medium 
- incremental demonstrations 
- identify/leverage existing 
events 
Assessment Low - develop MOEs and MOPs 
Funding Low - significant funding confirmed 
($500k), additional sponsors 
contacted 
 
                                                     Table 2: Risk Matrix 
 
 
  4.3 Development Strategy. 
 
The success of COASTS is dependent on the establishment of an 
open architecture that will facilitate the standardization and COTS 
interfaces that are critical to the system’s ability to keep pace with 
technology and to be available to coalition partners. 
 
A major element of the COASTS project will be to develop concepts 
of operation and Joint/Coalition tactics, techniques, and procedures 
for all the technologies integrated into the system. 
 
4.4 Acquisition and Contracting Approach. 
 
Development and integration efforts will consist of contractor and 
in-house government activities using a variety of contract vehicles.  
Contractors and vendors that are currently providing some of the 
technologies for Field Experiments will be approached and offered 
an opportunity to participate on a no-cost to the COASTS program 
basis (they will have an opportunity to demonstrate their 
technologies to U.S. and foreign partners in a marketing and testbed 
environment that is extremely difficult to replicate on their own).  
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Most contracts will be based on modifications of existing contractual 
arrangements. 
 




A primary goal of the COASTS project is to execute operational 
demonstrations with U.S. and coalition warfighters.  Accordingly, 
appropriate training materials will be developed for each 
demonstration and operator training will be conducted prior to each 
demonstration.  Training will be performed by a combination of 
contractor and government personnel.  There are also significant 
hands-on  educational opportunities for NPS students, and it is 
expected that multiple NPS masters theses will be generated by 




Maintenance and logistics support will be conducted using a 
combination of contractor support and in-house NPS expertise and 
facilities. This includes the development and distribution of 
maintenance, training, and operating manuals, instructions, or 
materials.  During the demonstrations, reliability, availability, and 





There could be safety or potential environmental hazards associated 
with technologies being considered.  As needed a safety analysis will 
be performed to identify potential safety hazards and risks and 
determine appropriate controls to preclude mishaps and reduce risks.  





This CONOP is intended to be a living document.  It will be updated as 
required to reflect changes to the COASTS project.  Most modifications will 
be at the discretion of the COASTS Oversight Group who will approve any 
substantive alterations to include changes in objectives, funding, schedule, 
and scope.  Any changes, which materially affect commitments made by 
coalition partners, will be approved by the affected organizations. 
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7.0 Points of Contact. 
 
- Mr. Brian Steckler, Information Sciences Department Faculty, 
(831) 656-3837, steckler@nps.edu 
 
- Mr. James Ehlert, NSA Cryptologic Research Chair for NPS and 























APPENDIX B.  COASTS AFTER ACTION REPORT 
28 July 2005 
 
From:  James Ehlert, Naval Postgraduate School 
To:  Information Sciences Department, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
 
Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR COASTS 2005,  MAY 06-21 
 
Ref:  
(a)  Concept of Operations (dated 15 March 2005) 
(b) Operations Order 02-05 (Thailand Rehearsal) 
(c) Operations Order 04-05 (Thailand Demonstration) 
(d) COASTS 2005 March After-Action Report (dated 21 April 2005) 
 
Encl: (1) Personnel Roster 
 (2) After Action Report 802.11/802.16 
 (3) After Action Report Balloon 
 (4) After Action Report UAV 
 (5) COASTS 2006 Initial Concept Timeline and Recommendations 
 
1.  Background.  The COASTS program is a joint project between the NPS and the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces.  The COASTS program is interested in researching low-cost, 
state-of-the-art, rapidly scaleable airborne and ground communications equipment suites 
including various wireless network technologies.  Along with the organizations 
mentioned above, numerous commercial vendors participated in the program to include 
Mercury Data Systems, Cisco Systems, CyberDefense UAV, Inter-4, Rajant Corporation, 
and Redline Communications.   
 
(a).  COASTS Field Experimentation 
 
During a field experiment conducted in Lop Buri, Thailand during May 2005, the 
COASTS team successfully integrated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerial 
balloons, portable and fixed ground-based sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
non-GPS enabled tracking systems, as well as other technologies to provide shared 
situational awareness to local and strategic users.   This demonstration focused on 
integrating all of the sensor data at a Royal Thai Army command and control vehicle, 
called a Mobile Command Platform (MCP), and then linking it to higher headquarters, 
specifically the Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters (RTAF HQ) and the Royal Thai 
Supreme Command (RTSC), both located at different compounds in Bangkok, Thailand.   
 
2.  Mission.  In conjunction with the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), the COASTS 
team conducted an operational rehearsal of the COASTS network topology in the Wing 2  
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(Lop Buri) training area of Thailand from 06-21 MAY 2005.  Further details pertaining to 
operational issues can be found in the Operations Orders 02-05 and 04-05 (references b 
and c respectively).    
 
3.  Personnel.  The COASTS team consisted of four faculty and eleven students from the 
NPS.  In most case, students were either conducting thesis research or deciding on a 
thesis research topic.  Several civilians representing private companies were also present 
to assist in implementing the technologies that COASTS employs.  See Encl (1) for a 
detailed roster of the team. 
 
4.  Operations. 
 
a. Scheme of Maneuver.   
 
Per the previous deployment to Thailand in March 2005, a field research exercise and 
demonstration was conducted in an iterative manner.  Building on the detailed field 
rehearsals which were conducted at Ft. Ord, California in February 2005 and the March 
2005ndeployment to Thailand, the network was re-established in Wing 2 (Lop Buri). This 
evolution was completed in four phases as follows:  
 
• Preparation 
• Network set-up  
• Network integration  
• Recovery.  
 
For this deployment, the preparation phase also included the evaluation period from the 
March lessons learned.   
 
(1) Preparation Phase. 
   
The team was initially formed in January of 2005; several organizational, planning, and 
equipment purchasing issues were resolved during this phase.  As some equipment did 
not arrive until after the February rehearsal, there was no opportunity to properly test and 
integrate those technologies into the network during the initial experimentation phase.  
The NPS acquisition staff did an outstanding job in responding very rapidly to purchase 
order requests; however, due to the cutting edge nature of this project, and the team’s 
unfamiliarity with many of the technologies and equipment requirements, many items 
were not identified until very late in the preparation phase.  There was a steep learning 
curve, but all parties persevered and ultimately acquired all necessary equipment for the 
deployment.  
Detailed coordination with our Thai counterparts was difficult.  This was primarily due to 
the fact that assignments within the RTARF were not clear until the team’s arrival in 
country.  The team deployed to Thailand with several important technical questions, 
relating the topology, unanswered.  
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The redeployment to Thailand in May 2005 involved many of the same difficulties from 
the March 2005 deployment, as well as some new ones. Most significant of the new 
problems were the loss of key personnel, and the sudden addition of certain new team 
members. Both the student team leader and the network lead left COASTS immediately 
after the return from the March 2005 rehearsal. The addition of four new personnel to the 
COASTS May 2005 deployment team also increased the difficulty level of integrating a 
functional team for demonstration.  
 
(2) Network Set-up Phase.   
 
This phase was difficult yet successful.  The ambitious goal was to arrive in Thailand 
with all coordination and knowledge needed to integrate with RTARF and successfully 
build the network in short order; in reality, the advanced party’s detailed site coordination 
visit was being completed even as the main team members arrived in country.    
Many important technical questions were not answered until the COASTS team members 
physically arrived at their operating locations around Thailand.  The team was able to 
rapidly assess the situation on the ground and react accordingly to construct the network.  
The COASTS team was undermanned and strained; especially when operations required 
team members to be spread across multiple sites.  The civilian vendor representatives 
played a critical role in filling gaps in the need for additional personnel. 
The majority of the problems identified during and after the March 2005 rehearsal were 
handled by the advanced party for the May demonstration, which was deployed to 
Thailand one week before the departure of the main body. With a combined two-person 
team, many of the identified problems were able to be completed prior to main body 
arrival. Considerable network set-up, logistical management, and site survey re-
verifications were accomplished during this lead time.  
 
 (a)  Airborne Wireless Access Points 
 
Employing a stationary, lighter-than-air vehicle equipped with a wireless access point is 
perhaps well suited to extend the effective wireless network range and user connectivity.  
For example, a helium filled, tethered balloon offers the advantage of a line of sight 
(LOS), over the horizon (OTH), Wi-Fi relay platform.  This same balloon can be outfitted 
with various antennas and amplifiers enabling the free-flow of viable information to and 
from the on-scene commander who may be positioned to support other assets miles away. 
In fact, helium balloons offer an inexpensive solution to maintaining the visual, audio, 
and sensory information required to conduct operations.  These balloons can be deployed 
within minutes and maneuvered into a position (altitude) several thousand feet in the air 
with a minimum radar cross section (RCS) and at an altitude safe from light arms fire.  
Equipped with an antenna, and the appropriate RF hardware, ground-based users can 
access the local tactical network through the balloon and receive real-time information 
while performing their mission.  The variety of information transferred is limited to the 
802.11 bandwidth and the software capabilities of the individual units. 
Peacekeeping, law enforcement, and first-responder personnel are frequently called upon 
to enter physical environments that adversely affect, or limit, the capabilities of current 
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communication tools.  Combining an all-weather balloon, equipped with Wi-Fi 
technology, and multiple ground Wi-Fi units, offers almost instant situational awareness 
and communications over any land or water mass.   This connectivity can reduce 




(3) Network Integration Phase.   
 
The biggest challenge during this phase was establishing the links between Wing 2 and 
the RTAF headquarters.  The COASTS team brought several Cisco routers to Thailand in 
order to make this happen.  The team worked side by side with the Thai communications 
staff at their network facilities to install and configure the routers.  Much troubleshooting 
and network experience was required to make the links work, but all links were up and 
tested by Monday of the second week. 
Another challenge, during network integration, was implementing various bandwidth 
enhancements. These enhancements were devised after learning the network’s limitations 
during the March 2005 evolution.  One of these enhancements, implementing multicast, 
proved to be easy to configure.  Multicasting was difficult to operate smoothly and the 
quality of multicast streaming video was very low.  This caused the team to revert to less 
efficient unicast video streaming.   
The other attempted measure was to combine the bandwidth of the two main links 
between Lop Buri and Bangkok.  One link was a T1 (Bangkok) and the other was an E1 
(Lop Buri).  Overcoming the bandwidth limitations between the two data pipes turned out 
to be too difficult.  This problem was put aside in the pursuit of other goals. 
Network integration was more difficult during the May 2005 deployment. Given the 
close timing of the two COASTS 2005 evolutions, a number of desired trouble-shooting 
efforts were not able to progress sufficiently in time for the May 2005 demonstration. 
The foremost issue, seen during the March 2005 deployment, was significant 802.11b 
connection problems.  
This issue necessitated the use of spectrum analyzers in the field to narrow the trouble-
shooting process.  The suspected conflict was signal interference between the air field 
assets and the COASTS 802.11b equipment.  There was not enough time to obtain the 
necessary equipment and train operators to perform a usable RF spectrum evaluation. 
This particular need, as well as a host of other needs expressed in reports attached below 
and within the team’s corporate knowledge, will be considered in planning the site survey 
and coordination trips prior to the first COASTS 2006 rehearsal trip. 
Ultimately, the team performed a successful demonstration, even given the setbacks in 
network setup and loss of aerial assets.  
  
  (4)  Recovery Phase.   
 
A coalition debrief was conducted after the operation.  Good feedback and lessons 
learned were exchanged from both sides.  In addition, a draft timeline and schedule were 
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discussed for COASTS 2006.  This dialogue will prove to aid in the planning and 
preparation for the next deployment. 
The recovery phase of the May evolution had smooth elements, which were based on 
experiences from the March 2005 deployment. Once again, the importance of Equipment 
Density Lists (EDLs) for each node was realized as a key component of the 2006 
deployment. Inventorying equipment in the recovery phase was time-consuming, but with 
the focus of packing based on accuracy, time was not factored into the paperwork.  
While the gathering and inventorying of equipment was handled properly, the packing 
and embarkation lacked proper attention to detail. Further care should have been taken to 
ensure an even weight distribution across all shipping containers, considering the high 
cost of transporting overweight luggage on commercial carriers. The return trip from 
Thailand cost over $1300 (U.S.) in oversized baggage fees.  
  
 b.  Safety.   
 
A safety officer was appointed and an operational risk assessment was conducted.  There 
were no major safety incidents during the trip.  However, there was some unsafe activity 
in installing 802.16 antennas on the radio tower at Lop Buri.  The surrounding 
environment required the antenna to be placed on the tower over 60 feet.  The COASTS 
team did not have the proper safety equipment and had to improvise.  Some safety 
equipment and harnesses were procured on the spot.  Overall, this climbing requirement 
was not identified early and was a potential hazard.   
The safety hazards to the climbing team at the 802.16 node were addressed through the 
addition of safety gear, and the focus on the usage of professional Thai climbers. No new 
safety hazards were experienced during the May 2005 exercise. 
One safety oversight did occur since emergency cards were not distributed to the May 
team. Although no injury resulted, it is an important oversight to note to prevent future 
omissions.  
    
5.  Logistics. 
 
a. Embarkation.   
 
The basic embarkation plan was to shuttle the equipment in standard size Pelican cases.  
These cases were checked as luggage aboard commercial air.  Several oversized items 
were shipped via FedEx to JUSMAGTHAI via our U.S. Embassy point of contact.  All 
items shipped FedEx were shipped prior to the team’s departure, and arrived in country 
within days.  However, it still took up to three weeks for the items to clear Thai customs.  
Overall, the embarkation plan worked and there were no issues. 
New shipments for the May 2005 demonstration all arrived on time and none were held 
by customs. More equipment was brought to Thailand by the main body.  
 
b. Equipment.   
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Much of the equipment for COASTS was either provided from civilian companies 
through Limited Purpose Collaborative Research and Development Agreements (LP 
CRADAs), or was procured by the team.  Purchase orders (POs) were the vehicle to buy 
equipment.  While students are generally the individuals who identify requirements and 
draft POs, tight control must be kept on the process.  Students that have a need to call 
vendors directly in planning a purchase order must be briefed on applicable rules and 
procedures before doing so.  The staff at NPS dealing with POs was very supportive of 
the COASTS project and understood the reason for late requirements and the need for 
quick action.       
 
c. Transportation.  
 
A majority of the ground transportation in Thailand was provided by the RTAF.  A 45 
passenger bus was put in direct support of the team for a majority of the trip.  This 
oversized bus was needed due to the amount of equipment.  In addition, several civilians 
were accommodated in the interests of mission support.  At Lop Buri, several vans were 
contracted for the team.  These proved critical in making numerous logistical runs around 
the Lop Buri area.  Organic transportation was necessary for the success of the mission. 
In both deployments, only one incidence of miss-management occurred. At the end of the 
March 2005 deployment, the return bus to the airport did not arrive prior to the team 
departure.  This incident was minor and easily addressed by the use of the local taxi 
service. 
 
d. Gear Storage.   
 
The RTAF provided short term storage for much of our equipment that will be used 
during the May 2005 deployment.  The equipment was stored at the Search and Rescue 
Squadron Facility in Wing Two.  Long-term storage was also managed by the RTAF at 
Wing Two in Lop Buri. All equipment was accounted for with no losses.  
 
6.  Communications. 
 
a. Communications Links. 
 
(1) 802.11.  
 
802.11b was the backbone of the wireless mesh at Wing Two.  In the March 2005 
rehearsal, the team did not have a dedicated individual managing these links to ensure 
success.  As a result, some antennas were not located properly and optimum performance 
of the 802.11 network was not accomplished at Wing Two.  Time constraints limited 
detailed troubleshooting.  One possible reason for poor 802.11 performance, could have 
been other antennas and interfering RF energy around the tower facility.  
The May 2005 team attempted to compensate for the lack of a dedicated 802.11 manager 
by assigning the duty to one node leader. The use of the 802.11 across many different 
nodes is too big for one person to control the trouble-shooting process in the field.   
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COASTS 2006 will assign at least 3 individuals knowledgeable of 802.11 and antenna 
deployment to broaden trouble-shooting efforts. 
The Rajant Breadcrumbs were strongly affected by weather and distance and were not 
able to be deployed as advertised by contractor specifications. The lack of fans, a heat 
sink, and a vent in plastic cases caused the equipment to seemingly overheat on a regular 
basis. The network placement of these Breadcrumbs had to be adjusted considerably from 
our original intention of a long-distance surveillance network.  
Different 802.11 equipment needs to be integrated into future COASTS 2006 
deployments in order to extend the desired range of the wireless network cloud. The 
environmental factors were too much of an effect on the Rajant Breadcrumb for it to be 
utilized by design.  A more resilient model will be required before this technology can be 
considered tactically effective. See enclosures 4 -7 for more technical descriptions of the 
802.11 network deployment and future recommendations for deployment. 
 
 
(2) 802.16.   
 
The 802.16 links worked very well.  Once established, these links supplied data rates up 
to 54MBps.  The main issues were found in set-up, particularly when creating the shot 
between Lop Buri and Wing 2. 
Upon the return to Thailand in May 2005, the advance party inventoried the 802.16 
equipment, and surveyed the downtown communications facility, and the placement of 
that antenna. During the first day of operations, one of the AN-50s experienced a power 
surge, making the unit inoperable. Re-setting the fuses did not correct the problem, 
highlighting the seriousness of the damage form the surge.   
The 802.16 links were re-established in little time. See enclosures 4 -7 for more technical 
descriptions of the 802.16 OFDM link deployments. 
 
(3) T-1 Landline  from Wing Two to RTAF HQ.   
 
This link was difficult to establish because several routers had to be installed.  This 
requirement was identified on the fly and the RTAF had to locate the appropriate 
personnel to execute the appropriate changes. 
Considerable time was used by the advance party and the May 2005 main deployment 
body to achieve the establishment of the T-1 link. The T-1 became the primary 
demonstration link, but multicast and load-balancing was never achieved during the tests.  
 
(4) E-1 from Lop Buri. 
 
No significant problems with this link were observed. 
 
(5) E-1 from RTAF to RTSC.   
 
This link was tough to establish.  The primary reason for this was the fact that the link at 
the Royal Thai Supreme Command (RTSC) was routed to a conference room, not an 
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established command center.  Again, the network engineering experience on the team 
made the link successful.   
 
(6) Satellite Communication Link.   
 
This link was made by a civilian company called SweDish.  It was not operational until 
late on the last day of operations.  For this reason, we were unable to integrate it and pass 
traffic across the link.   
Various planning was put into place to establish the Satellite network for the 
demonstration. Unfortunately, the cost of the usage of the satellite network made it 
impossible to afford the satellite connection for more than one day. The day of the 
demonstration was not enough time to properly integrate the satellite into the network 





(1) TrakPoint.   
 
The software integration worked as advertised and met the stated requirements for the 
exercise.  Using the software, members from the Royal Thai Armed Forces were able to 
monitor the situation at Wing Two and control cameras from their command post in 
Bangkok.  
TrakPoint was functional for the May 2005 demonstration but significant set-up obstacles 
were necessary to overcome in accomplishing its implementation. The major contributing 
factors hindering a smooth and successful integration was the lack of a stable 802.11 
network, changes in Areas of Operations, and key personnel tasked with maintaining 
network connectivity and troubleshooting.  The sensor inputs and network performance 
functionality of TrakPoint are dependant on a stable network for integration, 
management, and event population.  With the difficulties in establishing a functional 
mesh, troubleshooting and optimization schedules were shortened creating a significant 
lag in effective implementation.  From these lessons learned, a major developmental 
change has taken place to correct the architecture to a Publish/Suscribe system.  This will 
negate the issues resulting in a lack of performance of the TrakPoint application in 
COASTS 2005.  Increased training by all 2006 team members, as well as the addition of 
a student software liaison between NPS and Mercury Data Systems (MDS), will be 
initiated to compensate for user end problems. Greater coordination will provide for 
greater success for TrakPoint.  
 
(2) Router Configuration.   
 
All network requirements and router configurations were eventually identified and 
installed.  The success in these links made the topology possible.  Several key individuals 
had extensive networking knowledge that was critical.  Detailed experience in these skill 




(1) CAMERAS.   
 
The Sony camera worked well and as designed.  However, it did not work well on the 
balloon platform.  The balloon, even in light wind conditions, experienced too much jitter 
and did not provide a stable enough platform for the camera.  It must be noted that the 
primary purpose for the balloon is to act as a breadcrumb 802.11 node, not a camera 
platform.   
In May 2005, more cameras were implemented into the network to fulfill various sensor 
requirements. The number of cameras used necessitated a camera node manager to be 
created in-country. This task fell on the 802.11 node manager, who was already over-
worked concerning breadcrumb issues. All cameras operated well, although with the 
increase in cameras, the importance of compression software for the network became 
apparent.  
In COASTS 2006, cameras will be included in the planned cross-training between all 
deploying COASTS team members, and will become the overall responsibility of the 
Sensor node leader.  
 
(2) Crossbow Sensor.   
 
This device was not able to be implemented.  The problem was diagnosed as software 
related.  With insufficient manpower and resources, a decision was made not to continue 
troubleshooting, but rather make a site visit to the vendor upon return to the United States.  
The Crossbow Company is located within 60 miles of the NPS. 
Before the return to May 2005 , LT Cone and Mr. Mike Clement traveled to Crossbow in 
order to improve their training concerning the implementation of the sensors into the network 
correctly. Further training enabled a successful set-up for the demonstration in May 2005.  
The Crossbow suite will be augmented by the MDS deployable sensor suite in the next 
COASTS 2006 deployment.  
 
  (3) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).  
 
The UAV (provided by CyberDefense UAV) performance in the May 2005 demonstration 
was limited due to the extreme wind conditions. Although the network camera was able to 
integrate into the network, the UAV itself was unable to maintain sustained long flights as 
the swirling Lop Buri winds were too strong for the UAV operator to compensate for, 
resulting in a very early mission-ending crash. The CyberDefense UAV system was light 
weight, highly portable and had the potential to significantly add to the demonstration.   
 
7.  Host Nation Support.  Other than pre-deployment planning at the action officer level, 
host nation support was excellent.  All requests for equipment and support were met.  In 
addition, ad hoc and unanticipated support requests were also handled very quickly and 
efficiently.  The professionalism and hospitality of the Thai military was noteworthy and a 
positive experience for all involved. 
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8.  Aviation Operations.  The team appointed an Air Marshall to conduct all aviation 
planning and coordination.  This proved invaluable as there were many aviation issues to be 
addressed.  Prior to arrival in Thailand, several aviation information items were unknown.  
Many of these issues were sorted out during a confirmation brief upon arrival.  Planned daily 
air meetings were rolled into a group meeting for the day.   
The aviation meeting should be a separate meeting in future efforts.  Several air assets were 
not able to support the operation due to real world requirements.  This turned out to be good 
as network set-up took longer than expected.  Several important flights were made with the 
AU-23 Peacemaker but connectivity to the 802.11b network during was marginal.   
In the May 2005 demonstration, the Air Marshal was unable to join the team until exercises 
were underway for almost four days. This placed training of a deputy Air Marshal at the 
forefront of deployment training. LT Lee, as the balloon operator, was the most logical to 
fulfill this role, and accomplished all required tasks with no incidents.  
 
9.  Future Operations.   Planning for COASTS 2006 is underway; the POC is Mr. James 




     // signed // 
MR. JAMES EHLERT 
     COASTS Thailand Project Manager 
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO OPERATIONS ORDER 04-05 (THAILAND 
REHEARSAL) 
PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT MATRIX (Revised for 28JUL 2005 AAR to reflect actual 
deployment manning) 
 














COASTS Team Leader       





     
COASTS Faculty       
Mr. Mike Clement Software 
Integration 
COC  COC   
J.P. Pierson Network COC     
COASTS Students       
LT Robert Hochstedler Student Lead 
/ 
802.16     





































LT Chris Lee Balloon   Balloon Node 
Input 
Balloon  Y 
ENS Collier Crouch UAV  Embarkation 
Plan, CD UAV 
Input 
CD UAV Cyber 
Defense 
Y 
Capt. Steve Urrea Software 
Integration 
 
     
LT Bruce Iverson Data 
Analysis  
    Y 
LTjg Josh O’ Sullivan  802.11 Lead Camera 
sensors 
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COASTS Vendor Support       
Flt.Lt. Sunyaruk Prasert Liaison      
Red Line 
  
802.16      
Inter-4 
- N/A 
PDA      
Cyber Defense 
- N/A 
UAV      
Mercury Data Systems 
- Mr. Ryan Hale 
- Rich Guarino 
Software 
Integration 
     
Crossbow 
- N/A 
Sensor      
Cpt. Chayutra Pailom Software 
Integration 
     
Flt.Lt. Sunyaruk Prasert Liaison      
Rajant Corporation 
- N/A 
802.11      
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After Action Report 
COASTS 2005 
802.16/802.11 Network  
 
 
Review of Networking Goals: 
 
• Create 802.11b network to process and distribute digital data including: 
- video streaming 
- text 
- sensory information 
- audio 
 
• Establish Long-haul 802.16 links between Wing Two Air Tower, the Lop Buri 
Downtown Communications Building and the Mountain Communications 
Facility. 
• Obtain 11 Mbps connectivity with all nodes within the 802.11b mesh network 
• Obtain 54 Mbps connectivity through 802.16 links 
• Provide real-time data to client links (Tacticomps and laptops) through mesh 
network 
• Provide real-time response tools implementing TrakPoint Software. 
• Integrate 802.11, 802.16, 802.3 protocols to establish continuous real-time data to 





• 802.11b network established 
• 802.16 links established 
• Real-time data reached every node in the network 
• Trak Point software implemented 
• Integration of various protocols achieved 





• The two days spent at Wing 6 at the Air Field allowed for consolidation of all the 
equipment shipped in early February and shipped out in advance through Federal 
Express.  All the equipment was accounted for, packed for operational use, and staged 
for operations.  This set-up allowed for laying out the gear in a centralized area 
facilitating personal interaction and rapid coordination for troubleshooting and 
systems configuration. 
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• Automated network management tools that are SNMP enabled might allow for 
greater network awareness, yet limit the impact on node operators.  Recommend 
looking into software that will pull some of this information from system devices.  If 
manning constraints can support a recommend one person be designated Network 
Operations Chief as a sole assignment. 
 
• The installation of this 802.16 link represented a significant investment in personnel, 
time, and resources.  The resources required during this installation set us back in 
terms of set-up, and operations conducted at Wing 2 and at RTAF/RTSC.  Key 
personnel (Mr. Ryan Hale, Mr. John Pierson, LT Rob Hochstedler, Mr. Andy Eu, and 
Mr. Brian Steckler) were tied up for two days at this site.  Prior site survey would 
have discovered that the antenna mast would need to be scaled, to a height of at least 
150 feet, requiring, safety harness, rope and pulley system, gloves and a ladder just to 
access the structure.  Aspects that could have been mitigated through a site survey 
stole away personnel for a significant amount of time because answers we sought 
were not provided and because the site was not previously reconnoitered.  
 
• Ensure teams of two (at a minimum are deployed to set-up 802.16 links in the future.  
Apply lessons learned from this installation to better prepare for future 802.16 
installations in the future.  Had this team had access to the laptop running Redline 
Communications RF Monitor application and access to the AN-50 Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) the full 54Mbps would have been attained.  
  
• The purchase of these antenna masts will make it possible to set up 802.16 antennas 
in any location independent of an existing antenna mast or man-made structure.  
Research and procure two 28 foot collapsible antenna masts to raise 802.16 antennas.    
 
• Throughout the planning phase COASTS 2005 was designed to incorporate the use of 
the Mobile Command Post (MCP).  Days prior to our deployment NPS learned that it 
would lose the MCP due to real world requirements, but at the last minute earned that 
the MCP would be made available for COASTS ’05 Phase II.  The MCP did not play 
a role in the May 2005  demonstration.  The integration of high profile assets such as 
the MCP, need to be planned very early in the process. 
 
• COASTS members and Thai counter parts must be involved in a site survey.  Inputs 
from the RTARF concerning terrain, landmarks and placement of network assets are 
vital. 
 
• Ensure sufficient time is allotted for gear accountability and configuration before any 
type of operation is planned.  Conduct localized and full scale operations with all 
equipment similar to our efforts at Wing 6 flight line to ensure all essential equipment 
is accounted for, properly configured and ready for operations. 
 
• Training on utilizing the Rajant Breadcrumb must be given to all personnel involved 
in the operation.  The 802.11b lead needs to be responsible for the procurement, 
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inventory, and coordinating the deployment and retrieval of breadcrumbs, antennas, 
and other mesh network related equipment.  
  
• The 802.11 lead should have a thorough knowledge in operating Breadcrumb Admin 
(BCAdmin) and the deployment concerns of the breadcrumbs. This person also needs 
to be familiar with radio wave propagation and antennae patterns. 
 
• Distance for SE, ME with 8 dBi omni-direction external antenna was limited to 300 
meters with partial to full line of sight for 11 Mbps.  The SE internal/ ME external 1 
dBi antennas were limited to roughly 100 meters for a full 11 Mbps. 
 
• The ideal configuration for the command center was to hardwire through an Ethernet 
cable to an XL with an external 8 dBi omni-directional external antenna. Co-located 
with an SE connected to an 18 dBi flat-panel external antenna, directed in the 
direction of a balloon or other large distance Breadcrumbs. 
  
• The battery life for all the Breadcrumbs was limited to an operational optimal time of 
6 hrs. Ideally in an operational environment, each Breadcrumb that will be running on 
batteries should have two batteries. 
 





• Points of contact and support personnel from the Thai military need to be identified 
and assigned to the project much earlier in the process and through official tasking. 
 
• For future deployment, recommend using SE for all Ethernet required connections, 
such as cameras, due to their reliable RJ45 interface and using ME for linking and 
redundant nodes, due to their dual external antennas. 
 
• Ensure a site survey of all locations that will support network operations are inspected 
during site survey and planning conference meetings.  Ensure proper personnel with 
technical expertise execute site surveys in order to properly assess the situation.  
Additionally, see item #2 above for assignment of Thai personnel to the COASTS 
mission. 
 
• All antennas need to be 6ft off the deck to get best signal propagation. The SE have 
internal antennas and also need to be located 6ft off the deck. The use of 7ft PVC 
pipes, procured locally, worked well.
• BCAdmin uses about 2 Mbps of network traffic per operating client. The number of 
clients running should be limited to provide more bandwidth. 
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• The Rajant Breadcrumbs are not a reliable solution in this hostile environment. It is 
recommended that Rajant research improving reliability in this kind of environment 
or COASTS needs to research replacing with a better breadcrumb.  
o Change the color of the boxes (black is not a good color for heat) 
o Increase internal air flow - add internal fan(s) 
o Install heat sinks on some of the internal components 
o Upgrade standard to 802.11g or 802.11n for better distance and speed 
 
• DLINK AP2100 Wireless Access Points were linked with 14.5 dBi Yagi Antennas 
with a nearly perfect point-to-point bridge for providing constant and consistent T1 
connectivity between the Wing 2 Comm Center and the Command Operations Center 
(COC). In the future, utilizing more of these WAPs for wireless links should be 
investigated.  For example a point-to-point or point-to-multipoint bridge would have 
been a better choice than a breadcrumb for linking the firehouse to the network.  The 
unreliability of a single bread crumb for a presentation link resulted in a number of 
connection problems during our local demonstration. The use of a DLINK WAP may 
have been a better alternative in connecting the COC to the mesh network as a more 
reliable connection. 
 
• The payload (a modified XL) on the balloon and the COC XL needs to be tested 
operating together. The XL would consistently reset itself when trying to form a link 
with the balloon’s payload. This may have been a configuration issue with the way 
the two breadcrumbs establish their IP addresses, however, this was unable to be 
tested during this demonstration due to the unavailability of the balloon payload at the 
end of the deployment.  
 
• Overall, the team did not have enough breadcrumbs to accomplish the intended 
mission. To properly employ the Rajant breadcrumbs in this hostile environment, it is 
very important to employ an overlapping, redundant mesh. Single breadcrumbs would 
work less reliable than two co-located breadcrumbs. In fact the team would have been 
unable to meet our network requirements if it had not been for the 4 breadcrumbs and 
cable connectors returned from the Phuket Tsunami Relief Area. 
 
• The team deployed with a shortage in the number of connecting wires for external 
antennas to Breadcrumbs, resulting in less than optimal network configurations. 
There were no ready repair connectors in case a cable was damaged and the inability 
to utilize all antennas due to a lack of connectors particularly N-type to N-type. 
Varying lengths of cable were limited and reduced the options for ideal antenna 
placement. 
  
• Tracking names of the breadcrumbs was an issue. In the future the 802.11b lead 
should recommend changing the names of the breadcrumbs from numbers to words. 
For instance, change ME 03-245 to ME Yorktown and then mark the name on the 
Breadcrumb. A number of personnel had issues remembering the numbers on the 
Breadcrumbs. 
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• Writing the deployment location and configuration on the Breadcrumb prior to the 
operation helped in integrating network assets. 
 
• If balloons are utilized in the future, they should contain two separate bread crumbs 
and more than one balloon should be used in a given footprint.  
 
• To reduce the bandwidth constraints of cameras, the use of MPEG4 and multicast 
through a UDP protocol needs to be further tested and researched.  This will eliminate 
the constraints of Motion JPG.  For a future configuration, use MPEG4 for real-time 
monitoring and streaming to long distances and locally store Motion JPG to a server 
through the camera software for after action analysis. 
 
• Before using cameras on the network, ensure all computers have been properly 
upgraded. To run MPEG4 streaming, the connecting computers require an upgrade to 
DirectX 9. Due to the undocumented requirement and lack of Internet access, 
multicasting was not fully tested. 
 
• The Rajant Breadcrumbs, although advertised as a one-switch network solution, 
proved to be somewhat more difficult when forced to interoperate with an existing 
network topology. The primary difficulty introduced was the use of a 10.x.y.z/24 IP 
address space that was not DHCP-controlled by the Breadcrumbs. Though it can be 
strongly argued that the addressing scheme was not a significant issue in most cases, 
there were certain elements that had to be adjusted to accommodate the Breadcrumb 
design. Unfortunately, the Breadcrumb design elements that were affected by this 
scenario were undocumented for the end user (e.g. that the Breadcrumbs used 
10.x.y.1/8 addresses, so external gateways cannot also use those addresses when the 
Breadcrumbs operate in Bridge mode), so without having Rajant representatives on-
site, this difficulty would have been a much worse issue. This lack of documentation 
needs to be corrected before the next evolution, to avoid future problems. 
 
•  Could not fully integrate Crossbow sensors due to network stability issues, and due 
to lack of time/support for integration with TrakPoint 
 
• Dedicate a Chief Engineer or Lead Systems Integrator, whose job it is to oversee all 
technical developments, with the primary concern of ensuring that all the pieces of 
the system that are developed will integrate together into a coherent system. This 
position should not be tied down with significant in-the-weeds technical tasks, though 
the technical capacity to do these tasks is necessary. 
 
• Initiate a System Design Process, with a top-down method of specifying the system. 
This begins with defining high-level requirements for the system (e.g. What targets 
does this system need to detect), specify and delegate meaningful components of this 
system (e.g. Wireless backbone that provides a gateway to local networks, aerial view 
of the ground that can visually detect targets), and allowing research groups of 
students and faculty to design the component and choose products that meet all the 
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needs (e.g. choosing a camera that matches the power constraints of the balloon). This 
also requires oversight, possibly provided by the Chief Engineer, but possibly with 
help from a Systems Engineer, which is a separate but related discipline. 
• Clearly define the roles of each individual and each vendor, and making a clear and 
well-known chain of command both for NPS internally and for interaction with 
vendors and with coalition partners. 
 
• Lacked some needed backup software, including backup Operating System install 
media 
 
• TrakPoint operated successfully with some last-minute changes/fixes in the field; 
contained (undemonstrated?) support for Sony Cameras; did not accomplish 
integration with Crossbow sensors. 
 
• TrakPoint GPS tracking was successfully demonstrated by time of demonstration 
 





Review of Balloon Node Goals: 
 
• Use the balloon to create a center node for a mesh network 
• Create a suitable video image from the balloon in order to support a tactical picture of 
the environment. 
• Test the propagation paths of various antenna configurations to test 802.11 signal 
strengths. 
• Establish power requirements for the balloon payload. 
• Determine environment limitations to equipment attach to payload 





• The balloon was successfully established as a center piece for the Breadcrumb mesh 
network.  The maximum altitude was not achieved due to physical constraints and the 
lack of wind conditions or lack of signal strength from the host network to achieve 
the desired 2000 ft. 
 
• Maximum continuous throughput achieved was ~ 2Mbps.  The most optimal antenna 
configuration seen during the demonstration was a horizontal and vertical dipole 
staged 90 degrees apart. 
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• Video image was established from the balloon and the camera could be controlled via 
wireless interface.  Camera control was established in Bangkok via 802.16 structure.  
Video imagery was not the primary mission of the balloon, however this imagery did 
give first hand analysis of the strength of the network. 
 
• Power requirements for the particular payload was determined.  The batteries can last 





• Without wind, the Sky-Doc balloon only lifts 16.8 lbs 
 
• SkyDoc Balloons did not send a detailed operational guide for the balloon.  Specifics 
on the operation of the balloon will be included in the Operational Guide for the 
balloon node. 
 
• The winch is only capable of holding 2000 ft of the 1000# line.  Smaller line might be 
used to extend operational characteristics of the balloon. 
 
• The winch depletes a 12 VDC / 60 AH battery in ~4 hours of use. 
 
• Continuous operations of the winch for more than 30 minutes will cause extreme heat 
conditions.  These temperatures can be minimized with adequate air flow across the 
winch housing.  Keep winch out of the high temperature and rain as much as possible. 
 
• The Sony camera proved to be very durable.  It demonstrated survivability in extreme 
environmental conditions. 
   
• The toolbox is not the most desirable platform to send in the air due to its broad faces 
and terrible aero-dynamic features. 
   
• The balloon should be launched in an area clear of mountains or conditions that create 
swirling winds. 
   
• The maximum throughput achieved was 11 Mbps for <3 minutes.  Found that the 
Breadcrumbs are susceptible to high temperature conditions and humidity.  These 
devices need some sort of internal fan or environmental control when used in 
environments such as Thailand. 
 
• Need at least 3 people staged at the balloon for operations (changing the payload, 
filling the balloon, etc.) 
 
• Winch can be adjusted to increase amount of line it can hold. 
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• Maintaining a stable image from the balloon is very difficult at low altitudes.  Need 
stability lines from the payload to the balloon tether.  Simple adjustment creates 
significant stabilization. Storing the balloon in an uncontrolled environment 
(warehouse) causes the material of the balloon to become weak and brittle. 
   
• The extreme heat (100+ F) and intense sunlight of Lop Buri also caused some 
deterioration of balloon material.  The valve connection lost its adhesiveness during 
operations which caused air to leak out of the balloon.  Due to the location of the 
valve and unfamiliarity of proper position during operations, uncontrolled leakage of 
air occurred during balloon operations. 
 
• Inadequate air pressure coupled with high wind conditions (12 knots +) resulted in 
uncontrollable balloon flight characteristics (intense spirals and rapid side 
movements).  These flight patterns resulted in significant occurrences of the balloon 
making contact with the ground and the local foliage that created numerous pin holes 
in the balloon material which intensified the loss of helium during balloon operations.  
 
• The balloon was left over a two day period without supervision.  This resulted in an 
unobserved casualty to the balloon.  The balloon was not repairable. A 6 to 7 foot 
gash was created in the balloon material along one of the seams.  This failure was 
unforeseen and could have been due to extreme weather conditions or by human 
tampering.  Cause remains unknown. 
 
• The balloon payload consisted of a RAJANT Super Crumb powered by a UBI 2590 
15 Volt battery.  The unit was cooled by an internal fan and a Pan-Zoom-Tilt (PZT) 
Camera was attached to the unit through an Ethernet connection.  All loads were 
powered by the same source. 
 
• Battery operation was observed to last well over 6 hours with all loads operational.  
Due to the limited flight operations (loss of air), proper operation from the balloon 
payload was observed for a consistent period of time on the first and second day of 
operations.  The balloon payload provided connectivity within the local mesh, with 
limited wireless pipes (1 to 6 Mbps) to the remote network (Wing Two Control 
Tower).  
 
• Extreme winds and improper air pressure within the balloon caused irregular flight 
patterns.  These extreme turns and twists caused the battery source in the payload to 
come in contact with the sensitive computer parts which resulted in a failure to the 
motherboard housing and radio cards.  After this day of experimentation, the super 
crumb failed to operate correctly and connectivity to the local mesh did not exist.   
 
• Decision was made to attach an SE breadcrumb to the payload for future operations.  
Data was only collected with an 8dbi dipole antenna attached to the balloon.  Further 
experimentation with various antennas could not be performed due to the failure of 
the radio card housing. 
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• The balloon is ideally operated during moderate winds below 10 knots.  This is not an 
all weather balloon.  Extreme heat and solar conditions causes some deterioration of 
balloon material.  Winds greater than 10 knots must be in a consistent direction.  With 
swirling winds, the kite flap causes the balloon to twist with the changing winds and 
if the winds exceed 10 knots violent swirls have been observed. 
 
• The balloon winch operated successfully.  During extreme flight variations, the winch 
and line successfully maintained retrieval and deployment capability.  The winch is 
slow at best during operation.  Manual operation of the winch is suitable during 
modest winds, but is ill advised during winds that exceed 10 knots. 
 
• Carabiners were more than adequate to connect the balloon to tether. 
 
• For future use, a housing should be equipped for the winch to protect it  from rain and 
dust.  The only requirement for the maintenance of the winch is to grease the internals 
after operation.  Proper documentation on the type of grease was not provided by the 
manufacturer.  This will be resolved once INCONUS, and proper maintenance of the 




• For future balloon operations, it is recommended to use a simple 10 ft ball balloon.  
This balloon is rated with a 25 pound lift during any wind condition.  The only flight 
pattern that should be observed is a side to side motion.  With the smaller balloon, 
less helium is required and the cross section is much smaller.  The price of the 
balloon is significantly less than the Sky Doc balloons ($500.00 vice $2000.00) 
 
• A super crumb should be tested again as the payload on the balloon.  A multi-polar 
antenna should be used for radio signals.  The existing battery power is sufficient for 
greater than 8 hours of operation. 
 
• The balloon should always be filled with air when conducting subsequent operations 
to ensure that the balloon is free of holes or other material damage that will cause 
leaks.   
 
• Camera operation is still a luxury for the balloon operation.  The intent of the balloon 
payload is extend network connectivity over the horizon.  Camera on the balloon 
should be used as a safety parameter to monitor areas directly under the balloon. 
 
• The following items must be on hand for proper maintenance and handling of the 
balloon: 
– Patch kit (sealant and adhesives) 
– Work Gloves 
– Electricians Kit 
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– Various Antennas with adapters (SMA male, N male connections) 
– 3 to 4 bottles of 290 cu ft helium 
– 12 VDC car battery 
– 500 to 1000lb tether (Spectra) 
– 3-4 Carabiners 
– Crescent wrench 
– Assorted Screwdrivers 
– Hex Wrench set 
– 2 UBI 2590 military batteries with chargers. 
– 18 to 22 gauge wire 
– Electrical connectors (pin type) 






After Action Report 




• Demonstrate the capability of a man-portable mini-UAV as an integrated tactical 
collection platform for real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) at the squad level.  
 
Goals achieved: 
• UAV video-feed was integrated into the COASTS wireless network. 
• Tests the metrological effects upon the operation of the Cyber Defense Cyberbug 
UAV. 
 
Goals unattained:  
• UAV was unable to maintain consistent flight at Wing Two due to the combined 
density altitude.  
• Daytime operations prevented the test of the IR camera on the UAV.  
• The Integration of the UAV camera was not established via a direct link to the 
COASTS network. It was linked through a CyberDefense UAV proprietary laptop 
and fed through a video application to the COASTS network for display. 
 
Lessons Learned: 
• When deploying the UAV, the combined environmental effects on the density 
altitude at the launch location need to be reviewed prior to deployment. The 
Cyberbug operated optimally during tests in the United States. The temperature, 
pressure, and air density in Monterey, California was not substantial enough to 
affect the location’s air density. In Thailand, these factors combined to create the 
effects of an elevation at Lop Buri of 8500 feet of elevation. This created an air 
density to thick for the UAV to maintain flight.  
 
• The temperature effects upon the UAV itself need to be considered. Heat strongly 
effects the electrical components inside the UAV itself, degrading network 
connectivity, GPS, and computers during the pre-flight stage.  
 
• A more powerful UAV engine is recommended to overcome climatic 
considerations and to maintain flight in Thailand.  
 
• More than one UAV should be carried in order to ensure redundancy. 
 
• The Cyberbug UAV is a very stealthy platform when deployed. The gray-white 
color combination, small engine, and small overall sail area make the UAV very 
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